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JOINT AND COMBINED MILITARY FORCE:
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO AFRICAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

A Thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JONES OLADEHINDE AROGBOFA, MAJ, NIGERIA
B.S.C., M.S.C. Electrical Engineering, University of Alabama,
Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1983, 1985

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

JOINT AND COMBINED MILITARY FORCE: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO
AFRICAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS by MAJ Jones Oladehinde
Arogbofa, Nigeria, 146 pages.

Africa remains the least developed continent in the world. The dismal state of the continent's economic and political development underscores the myriad problems now afflicting most of the continent's states.

There have been many attempts to solve Africa's problems since it has attained independence. Despite these attempts, however, most states continue their downward slide. This writer opines that real progress will not be achieved until a majority of the states adopt some radical structural changes.

This study proposes one change which could provide some solutions would be to establish a Joint and Combined Military Force for Africa (JCMFA). The JCMFA would play a defense/deterrence role against external and internal intervention and aggression in Africa. It would also involve mediation and peaceful negotiation to resolve African crises.

The goals of the JCMFA would be to make Africa a safe, secure, peaceful continent in which African leaders could develop policies and procedures to forward African affairs. A secure and peaceful Africa would encourage economic growth, attract foreign investors, encourage technological development and industrialization, aid economic recovery, and stabilize African political and social systems.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Africa Salvation lies in the hands of her leaders and no where else. Only Africans can be the architects of their own fortunes; as they have been the architects of their misfortune for the past quarter of a century. Africans should therefore make their world a relevant part of the rest of the world.

General Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria),
24 October 1988¹

Africa economy remains the most depressed among world economies, primarily because of its huge debt burden. Africa is also afflicted with almost continuous political and military crises and social problems, and all of these problems are acerbated by frequent natural disasters (drought, desertification, and deforestation) and the constant flux of displaced persons.

Since African independence, leaders have tried in many ways to correct the continent's underdevelopment. But, because of the enormity of the problems, most efforts have proven ineffective. The situation has escalated from helpless to almost hopeless. One cause for this is that Africa is technologically poor. Another cause is poor leadership. Therefore, Africa's salvation rests on making structural and radical changes tenaciously pursued by

determined African leaders (Figure 1). In effect, Africa's salvation, as argued by General Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), lies in the hands of its leaders and the ability of its people to radically restructure the African system to allow for positive changes. However, no one has proposed resolving these problems through a force projection. This thesis intends to exploit this option as a solution, particularly concerning economics.

RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis asks: Will an established Joint and Combined Military Force for Africa (JCMFA) help solve African economic problems? Subordinate questions include--

- o How will the JCMFA be established among politically, economically, and culturally diverse African states?
- o Will each independent African state readily accept the JCMFA?
- o Who will fund the JCMFA?

ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Assumptions

I have made the following assumptions:

1. Some states and subregions, can maintain satisfactory co-existence.
2. The JCMFA will not attract negative attention of external forces.



ALGERIA-1962 (13,481,000)
Col. Chadli BENDJEDID, *President*

ANGOLA-1975 (7,950,000)
Jose Eduardo dos SANTOS, *President*

BENIN-1960 (4,338,000)
Bng. Gen. Mathieu KERÉKOU, *President*

BOTSWANA-1966 (1,149,000)
Dr. Quett K. J. MASIRE, *President*

BURKINA-1976 (6,278,000)
Cdr. Thomas SANKARA, *President*

BURUNDI-1962 (5,008,000)
Col. Jean-Baptiste BAGAZA, *President and Head of State*

CAMEROON-1960 (10,258,000)
Paul BIYA, *President*

CAPE VERDE-1975 (344,000)
Anídes PEREIRA, *President*

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC-1960
Gen. André-Dieudonné KOLINGBA, *Head of State* (2,868,000)

CHAD-1960 (4,844,000)
Hissène HABRE, *President*

COMOROS-1975 (415,000)
Ahmed ABDALLAH ABDEREMANE, *President*

CONGO-1960 (1,082,000)
Col. Denis SASSOU-NGUESSO, *President*

DJIBOUTI-1977 (312,000)
Hassan GOULED Apdon, *President*

EGYPT-1922 (51,830,000)
Muhammad Hosni MUBARAK, *President*

EQUATORIAL GUINEA-1968
Col. Teodoro OBIANG NGUEMA MBASOGO, *President* (340,400)

ETHIOPIA (48,706,000)
Lt. Col. MENGISTU Haile-Mariam, *Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council*

GABON-1960 (1,039,000)
El Hadi Omar BONGO, *President*

THE GAMBIA-1968 (780,000)
Sir Dawda Kairaba JAWARA, *President*

GHANA-1967 (13,848,000)
Prt. Lt. (Ret.) Jerry John RAWLINGS, *Chairman of PNDC*

GUINEA-1968 (6,738,000)
Gen. Lansana CONTE, *President*

GUINEA-BISSAU-1973 (928,000)
Bng. Gen. João Bernardo VIEIRA, *President*

IVORY COAST-1960 (10,787,000)
Félix HOUPHOUËT-BOIGNY, *President*

KENYA-1963 (22,378,000)
Daniel T. arap MOI, *President*

LESOTHO-1966 (1,822,000)
MOSHOE OE II, *King*

LIBERIA-1847 (2,384,000)
Gen. Samuel Kanyon DOE, *President*

LIBYA-1961 (3,307,000)
Col. Mu'ammer Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI, *no official title*

MADAGASCAR-1960 (10,731,000)
Adm. Didier RATSIRAKA, *President*

MALAWI-1964 (7,438,000)
Dr. Hastings Kamuzu BANDA, *President*

MALI-1960 (8,423,000)
Gen. Moussa TRAORE, *President*

MAURITANIA-1960 (1,863,000)
Col. Masouya Ould Sid Ahmed Ould TAYA, *President and Prime Minister*

MAURITIUS-1968 (1,080,000)
Anerood JUGNAUTH, *Prime Minister*

MAYOTTE (84,000)
French Territorial Collectivity
Chrstan PELLERIN, *Commissioner of the Republic*

MOROCCO-1956 (23,341,000)
HASSAN II, *King*

MOZAMBIQUE-1975 (14,538,000)
Joaquim Alberto CHISSANO, *President*

NAMIBIA (1,273,000)
Administered by South Africa
Louis A. PIENAAR, *Administrator General*

NIGER-1960 (6,889,000)
Bng. Gen. Seyni KOUNTCHE, *President*

NIGERIA-1960 (108,580,000)
Ibrahim BABANGIDA, *President*

REUNION (580,000)
French Overseas Department
Jean ANCIAUX, *Commissioner of the Republic*

RWANDA-1962 (6,811,000)
Maj. Gen. Juvenal HABYARIMANA, *President*

SAO TOME & PRINCIPE-1975
Dr. Manuel Pinto DA COSTA, *President* (114,000)

SENEGAL-1960 (7,084,000)
Abdou DIOUF, *President*

SEYCHELLES-1976 (68,000)
France Albert RENE, *President*

SIERRA LEONE-1961 (3,754,000)
Gen. Joseph MOMOH, *President*

SOMALIA-1960 (7,742,000)
Maj. Gen. Mohamed SIAD Barre, *President*

SOUTH AFRICA-1910 (34,313,000)
Pieter Willem BOTHA, *President*

SUDAN-1968 (23,525,000)
Sadiq al-MAHDI, *Prime Minister*

SWAZILAND-1968 (715,000)
MSWATI III, *King*

TANZANIA-1961 (23,502,000)
Ali Hassan MWINYI, *President*

TOGO-1960 (3,229,000)
Gen. Gnassingbe EYADEMA, *President*

TUNISIA-1956 (7,582,000)
Habib BOURGUIBA, *President*

UGANDA-1962 (15,908,000)
Yoweri Kaguta MUSEVENI, *President*

WESTERN SAHARA (84,000)
Contested area

ZAIRE-1960 (32,343,000)
Marshal MOBUTU Sese Sese, *President*

ZAMBIA-1964 (7,282,000)
Dr. Kenneth David KAUNDA, *President*

ZIMBABWE-1980 (9,372,000)
Robert Gabriel MUGABE

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Figure 1. Current leaders and populations in Africa.²

3. The 1977 African Festival of Arts held in Lagos, Nigeria, contributed toward improving social and cultural differences between African States.

4. Some African states may accept and fund the JCMFA.

5. The superpowers will help the JCMFA achieve its objectives.

Limitations

I foresee the following limitations:

1. Funding/resources.

2. Political and ideological differences.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The issue of Africa's underdevelopment has attracted tremendous interest among western scholars and Africanists. Within the realm of the social sciences, the works of Andre Gunder Frank (1966),³ and Enzo Falloto and Henrique Cardoso (1969)⁴ are especially instructive. Since the early 1950s, prominent scholars, such as David Apter and Gabriel Almond,⁵ have closely monitored Africa's development and modernization. In particular, Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (1960)⁶ highlight such political problems common to the Third World as political instability and subnationalism. Within economics, barriers to development have been given adequate attention by Africanists. The works of Talcott Parson⁷ are relevant to the sociological and psychological aspects of Third World underdevelopment.

The causes of Africa's underdevelopment criss-cross several fields in the social sciences, and many proposed solutions have primarily centered on economic, socio-cultural, and political variables. Despite the comprehensive nature of reforms, Africa's poverty and underdevelopment remains endemic. A.W. Clausen (1985),⁸ the former president of the World Bank, has compiled a digest of Africa's development.

Why reforms have not proven effective is a continuing source of concern to both scholars and politicians. I suggest a somewhat new solution in this thesis; I propose the establishment of a Joint and Combined Military Force for Africa (JCMFA).

The idea of having a common military force for Africa is not new per se. Political leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, the former president of Ghana, and many other public officials have previously proposed the idea and it has been euphemistically referred to as African High Command.

Although a number of works on African High Command exist most are policy speeches only found in governmental archives and African libraries. Therefore, it has been difficult to research the subject outside Africa. However, I doubt that literature exists establishing the possibility of a relationship between a common military and the reduction of the barriers to African development.

Available information does show that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was able to put up a 10-nation coalition force for a peace-keeping mission in Chad in the mid 1980s. Little is known about this coalition force, but it did receive the United Nation's (UN) approval. In the early 1980s, France tried to gain European Support and funds for an African security force.⁹ However, the effort was not successful.

Another coalition force, the Economic Community of West African States Peacekeeping Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), was set up in 1990 for a peace-keeping mission in Liberia. It is an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force, and it remains today.

During WWII, before the establishment of NATO, the allied forces formed a coalition force against the Germans. Recently, an alliance was formed among the allied forces led by the US, to stop Iraqi expansion. Besides those already noted, other paramilitary alliances and treaties include the nonaligned nations, the Warsaw Pact, and the North American Treaty. Within the international community, the coalition arrangement among NATO nations stands out. Much has been said about this alliance, and it is the basis for one of the case studies in this thesis.

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether establishing the JCMFA would provide a solution to African

economic problems. The thrust of the study is to explore past and present economic, political, and military crises with a view to justifying the establishment of the JCMFA and using it to resolve economic problems.

This is a three-part thesis. The first part (Chapter 1) discusses some economic, social, political, and military crises in Africa. The second part (Chapters 3 and 4) examine doctrine and the establishment of the JCMFA. The third part is a short analysis of why a JCMFA would be a desirable solution to Africa's economic problems.

In general, this thesis study is descriptive and analytical in style. Statistical correlations are used where necessary. Maps, charts, figures, and tables are also used to emphasize some points.

BACKGROUND

One cannot discuss Africa without referring to the economic, political, and military crises affecting the continent. In 1988, when the OAU celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary, these topics were the center of interest,¹⁰ and they continue to be of concern to both western and eastern nations. European leaders, in particular, have shown concern for the problems. In 1985, the US allocated to Sudan 271 million dollars. Sixty-three percent was earmarked for military assistance and 37 percent for economic growth.¹¹ In 1984, Reverend Jesse Jackson stated, "The national interest of the USA demands creative

diplomacy geared to a developmental foreign policy approach toward the African continent."¹² Andrew Young, former Mayor of Atlanta, Georgia, former US Ambassador to the UN, and a prominent black leader, saw the whole world, particularly Africa, as being threatened by depression, debt crisis, protectionism and war.¹³

Prominent African leaders such as General Olusegun Obasanjo (former President of Nigeria), General Ibrahim Babangida (President of Nigeria), Mr. Samora Machel (late President of Mozambique), Dr. Kwame Nkruma (the voice of Africa and late President of Ghana), Mr. Julius Nyerere (former President of Tanzania), Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings (President of Ghana), Bishop Desmond Tutu, and others have expressed grave concerns about problems ripping Africa apart. They have spent much time and effort looking for credible solutions. Unfortunately, as time goes by the crises become even more complex.

Some leaders believe that if the political crises are checked the situation will be corrected. A few feel a military option would eradicate the problems. Others believe that the economy is the root of the problem. However, the most dominant view is that "economic woes resulting in underdevelopment is the root cause of internal and regional conflict in Africa--not ideology or administration."¹⁴ Indeed, the prescription which has often been given to the economic ailment has been wrong, because

economic problems cannot be solved purely from political and military viewpoints.¹⁵ Comprehensive approaches must simultaneously address economic, political, and military dimensions of these crises.

National Power and the Place of Economy

For many nations, elements of National Power include politics, economics, national will, military power, and geography¹⁶. A nation with limited economic power is likely to be weak in other areas. Most nations, therefore, see economic power as vital, and efforts are made to protect it. In most cases, military power is an assured protective means. However, the military power used to deter external economic encroachment must be strong enough to meet the challenges. Most economically developed nations build highly formidable military forces. Usually, nations with weak economies also have weak military forces. Political power often fails because of economic disasters. Occasionally, some advanced nation may fall back on their military to achieve economic stability. For example, Napoleon the Great, Frederick the Great, and Hitler used military power to achieve political and economic dominance. The Gulf War was fought to not only liberate the Kuwaitis but also to ensure an uninterrupted energy supply from the oil-rich region. In essence, nations which are militarily capable can easily and readily achieve deterrence and gain respect.

The United States and the United Kingdom (UK) are nations that influence the growth of their economies with military projections. Also, under the protection of NATO, European Economic Community (EEC) member states are able to consolidate economic activities. However, there are usually exceptions to rules such as Iraq and the former Soviet Union. Despite military might, the economies of Iraq and the Soviet Union are in shambles. This can be explained. Both nations spent valuable time in projecting expansionism and placed too much emphasis on military power to the detriment of other elements of their national power. The cases of the US, UK, and EEC nations are, therefore, more representative of a positive means of achieving economic growth through military might.

Cooperative Institutional Arrangement in Europe and Africa

The arguments advanced for the military strength of the US, UK, and EEC nations serve as bases for establishing a JCMFA. The existence of organizations like NATO, EEC, ECOWAS, and ECOMOG also serve as bases for a JCMFA.

NATO, established in 1949, is a political framework for an international alliance designed to prevent aggression or repel it should it occur. It provides for continuous cooperation and consultation in political, economic, and military fields. Its functions include the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend

the territory of the member countries if aggression occurs.¹⁷ NATO is now a formidable force successfully holding member states together. The force behind NATO was partly responsible for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the crumbling of the Soviet Union.

Although changes in the new world order have brought about force reductions in Europe, the future role of NATO for a stable world order is still enormous. The EEC member nations, which are also members of NATO, have taken advantage of their membership and the strength of NATO to make the European economy buoyant. Under the watchful eyes of NATO, the EEC has flourished because member states no longer fear external intervention or aggression. (Note: Although the US is a member of NATO, it is not an EEC member state and, therefore, has experienced some economic difficulties from the EEC. However, it can still be argued that EEC is the successful economic arm of NATO.)

ECOWAS was established by 16 West African member states to foster economic and political cooperation among members. For over a decade, free market and enterprises have existed between members. ECOWAS also promotes free movement of citizens of member states within the West African sub-region. ECOWAS has achieved much success and is the most effective economic organization in Africa today. ECOWAS reduced the economic burden of some member

states through the free market participation process. Also, in 1990, it resolved a military crisis that would otherwise have devastated the Liberia.

ECOMOG, endorsed by almost all ECOWAS member states, is a peace-keeping force specially established to bring back peace to militarily ruined Liberia. ECOMOG has also assisted in reducing the mounting tension in Niger. Today, ECOMOG is a strong standing force in West Africa.

Economic and Social Situations

Of the five elements of power (geographic, political, national will, military, and economic), economic power is by far the most desirable in Africa, because the most disruptive crises in Africa are economic. All other crises revolve around economics. An economically powerful Africa is almost automatically guaranteed political and social powers. However, a powerful economy requires a strong military force. Hence the ideal situation for an economically powerful Africa is a powerful military force. The irony is that because Africa is not economically powerful, it requires a strong military force to help it gain economic power.

Economic activities of a nation naturally involve the process of combining inputs (natural resources, land, labor, capital goods) to produce outputs (food, consumer goods, capital equipment, public services).¹⁸ Some parts of Africa have climates conducive to agriculture. However,

in other areas, desert and drought create natural barriers to food production. Also, Africa does not have modern technology with which to develop industries and increase agricultural outputs. Labor is crude and output is low. This situation keeps Africa dependent on industrialized nations for finished products and makes it almost impossible for Africa to mobilize its resources (land, labor, capital) to achieve meaningful economic growth.

Political and Military Conditions

Of the six inhabited continents in the world, Africa is the most politically and economically troubled. Yet, it is a vast and diverse continent, comprising 50 independent states. It is bigger in land mass than the US, South America, and Europe combined.¹⁹ Africa represents at least 10 percent of the world population. African societies are old, but the states (fashioned by Colonial rule) are new. Most of them have only become independent since 1960.²⁰ Africa also has rich but diverse cultural, social, and language differences. Lumping these diverse states together under one political and economic umbrella seems improper. However, they have many things in common. For example--

- o Most of them were ex-colonies of colonial powers (UK, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).

- o They had such common goals as searching for new identities as nation-states.

- o They inherited unsettled political cultures.
- o They were all rural, poor, and dependent on world markets.
- o At the international level, they were diplomatically and militarily incompatible.²¹

Such common problems explain the apparent common political, economic, and military crises which afflict the continent. In India, colonial rule was prolonged and pre-independent rulership was controlled by the nationalists and supervised by the colonial masters. But in Africa colonial rule was too brief to have any unifying effect. There were no pre-independence trials, and post-independence handover of power was too abrupt to afford African nationalists enough political maturity to prevent the false allure of independent self-government. Parliaments were created overnight and political parties were in office before leaders could adequately organize their own affairs. Governments lacked clear lines of authority. They shifted from one form of association to another and were not effectively totalitarian.

In 1885, the Indian National Congress party was formed with over 50 years of political apprenticeship before independence. In contrast, the ruling Northern People's Congress in Nigeria was founded less than a decade before independence.²² This was the case in all African states.

Dennis Austin, author of "Africa Repartitioned" in Conflict Studies 193, a Centre for Security and Conflict Studies journal, describes African leaders of that era as "the leaders who rode the tiger of nationalism and could not curb his appetite."²³ While this is debatable, many share the view that ruling colonial officials can be justifiably accused of such, because they perfected the art of "divide and rule" which gave way to "unite and split" when they saw that retreat was inescapable.

With this situation, it was difficult for nationalists to have any experience in planning and management, much less visioning a global future for Africa. The consequence was despair replacing hope, instability and insecurity, and prosperity giving way to poverty and impoverishment.²⁴

To the rest of the world, it may not look as if Africa has been doing much to change the wheel of misfortune. That is not the case. Africans are aware of these problems and have been making concerted efforts by leaders, individuals, and organizations to forge progression. However, the political, economic, and military problems are enormously complex.

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CHAPTER 2

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY CRISES

The African economic crises are due primarily to insufficient structural transformation and the economic diversification that are required to move the continent away from inherited colonial economic structures, typified by a vicious interaction between excruciating poverty and abnormal low levels of productivity in an environment marked by serious deficiencies in basic economic and social infrastructures, most especially the physical capital, research capabilities, technological knowhow and human resources development that are indispensable to an integrated and dynamic economy.

OAU and ECA, Addis Ababa, 1986¹

Although this thesis is meant to answer questions on the resolution by military means of economic problems afflicting Africa, it is not sufficient to discuss only economic problems. In this chapter I will also critically examine political and military crises.

ECONOMIC CRISES AND THEIR CAUSES

Since independence, the economies of most African states have been largely dominated by a series of crises which have brought them to the brink of disaster. According to the UN, the world's poorest countries are in Africa. In support of this claim, in 1986 the OAU and the United Nation Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) adopted a

resolution on the African economic crisis. By this resolution, the OAU and ECA re-emphasize that insufficient structural transformation, lack of economic diversification, and deficiencies in basic economic and social infrastructures are major causes of African economic crises. Other causes include inflation, debt, climate, negative terms of trade, depleted foreign exchange reserves, increasing costs of development technology, refugee problems, and mismanagement resulting from maladministration.

Africa's Debt

In July 1989, economic projections indicated that by the end of 1990, the total African debt (excluding South Africa) would have reached 260 billion dollars, escalating to an estimated 600 billion dollars by the end of this century.² More than anything else, debt is Africa's major battle. African sovereign debt problems are overwhelmingly burdensome when compared with the extent of African economies and the states' ability to repay (the debt service ratio is presently higher than 40%). When compared to the gross domestic product (GDP) (and representing only 4% of total world trade), Africa's debt is among the highest in the world (Figure 2).

Many explanations have been advanced for why African states find themselves in this precarious position. One explanation is that the origins of African




FIGURE 2. AFRICA'S DEBT BURDEN³
External Debt As A Percentage Of GNP, 1990

debt lie in a complex inter-relationship of domestic and external causes. According to this explanation, debt is linked to the growing economic crises of many African states. In turn, the growing economic crises are blamed on the declining international economy.

Internal politics and policy factors are also responsible for the deplorable condition. Elliot Berg, the author of the "Berg Report," published in 1981 by the World Bank, argues that "Africa's desperate economic situation was attributable to the growth of a large public sector which swallowed up resources and used them inefficiently."⁴ This report summarizes the current Third World debt crises into three major fundamental causes:

1. The external shocks in the world economy such as the oil-price hikes of 1973-74 and 1979-80.

2. The bad economic policies and practices pursued by debtor states.

3. Inept lending policies on the part of commercial banks which are owed most of the Third World's international debt.⁵

Maurice J. Williams⁶ in his study of African debt and economic recovery, argues that the severe losses of export earnings as a result of depressed international commodity markets is a major factor. For example, he says that between 1980 and 1986 trade earnings for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) fell by 20 percent resulting in up to a

25-percent drop in per capita income, huge external payments deficits, and economic dislocation for the sub-region. Further analysis by Williams shows that this condition led to strict foreign exchange constraints which reduced productive capacity and which affected the abilities of African countries to service external debt.

Nonetheless, some African leaders blamed the crisis on external factors. Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, believes that the growth of African debts originates from the long-term trends governed by the terms of trade for primary commodities which are now declining. Others observe that the industrialized nations of the world have long systematically and craftily turned Africa into a dumping ground for their finished products instead of exporting technology to Africa so Africans can produce goods for themselves. This not only reduces Africa's production potential but also puts it in a position of permanent dependency. Crippled economies and huge debt are the results of these practices. However, these problems could have been avoided with timely and appropriate intervention.

Natural Disasters

Natural disasters have been offered as another explanation for African economic crises. In early 1984, one of the worst droughts of the century burned across most of Sub-Saharan and Central Africa. It destroyed crops,



Map 1. Vegetational map of Africa.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency,
OIC Map Services Center, Washington, D.C., 1992

livestock, and human populations (Map 1). However, droughts are recurrent and modern technology capable of providing irrigation systems in the affected areas would solve most of the problem. Other solutions include providing modern agricultural implements for mechanized farming and storage systems and campaigning against deforestation. However, much money would be required to implement these reforms. Because of poverty and under-developed technology, Africa cannot succeed alone. It requires the help of the developed nations.

In the past, most industrialized nations were preoccupied with supplying sophisticated weapons to Africa. Recently this trend has changed and more attention is now being paid to the human tragedies caused by nature and poverty. For example, according to a 1991 joint study of the World Bank and the World Food Program (WFP),⁷ between 1980 and 1990 food-aid deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa rose from 20.6 percent to 34.6 percent and from 2.3 percent to 6.9 percent for cereals and non-cereal foodstuffs, respectively. See Table 1 for more details. Table 2 shows the major recipients of food aid. A close comparison between food-aid deliveries (by category between 1987 and 1990) to Africa and the rest of the world clearly reveals the serious nature of food crises created by drought and other natural disasters in Africa (Figure 3). It is expected that population growth would require an increase

Table 1

Total SSA food imports and food-aid deliveries
(cereals and non-cereals)^a
(million tons grain equivalent)

Year	Cereals			Non-Cereals*		
	Total imports	Food ¹ aid	Food aid in imports (%)	Total imports	Food** aid	Food aid in imports (%)
1980/81	9.2	1.9	20.6	7.3	0.17	2.3
1981/82	9.4	2.2	23.4	7.5	0.19	2.5
1982/83	9.0	2.4	26.7	6.8	0.26	3.8
1983/84	10.5	3.0	29.1	7.8	0.22	2.8
1984/85	13.9	5.0	36.5	6.2	0.43	6.9
1985/86	9.7	4.3	44.3	6.1	0.45	7.4
1986/87	9.3	3.2	34.8	6.3	0.30	4.8
1987/88	9.0	3.8	41.8	6.1	0.43	7.0
1988/89	8.0	3.1	40.3	5.6	0.36	6.4
1989/90	8.1	2.8	34.6	4.8	0.33	6.9

* Data for non-cereals refer to the calendar year of the first year shown.

** Including local procurement which, however, represents only a small portion of total food aid.

Table 2

Major recipients of cereal food aid, 1987-90 average^a
(thousand tons grain equivalent)

Emergency	Program		Project		
Ethiopia	582	Mozambique	303	Ethiopia	108
Sudan	170	Sudan	258	Ghana	37
Mozambique	128	Zaire	116	Mozambique	33
Malawi	117	Kenya	68	Mali	31
Somalia	88	Madagascar	49	Senegal	26
Angola	50	Zambia	46	Lesotho	25
Uganda	18	Ghana	40	Malawi	25
Niger	16	Cape Verde	37	Sudan	25
Zambia	15	Senegal	36	Burkina Faso	24
Botswana	13	Angola	34	Kenya	20
Other	121	Mauritania	34	Other	241
		Other	283		
Total Africa	1,318		1,304		585

Share of top 5 in total(%)	82.3	60.9	39.5
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Share of top 10 in total (%)	90.8	75.7	59.5
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in food import and aid deliveries to Africa if drought problems are not resolved. According to the three examples of food-gap scenarios, SSA food requirements could rise from 100 million tons of cereal and non-cereal food in 1990 to a whopping 410 million tons by the year 2020. These figures are based on the projected population growth of 500 million in 1990 to 1,500 million in 2020 (Table 3).

Other world bodies like the Red Cross, US Aid, and Project Hope ("Adopt a Child: Feed the Hungry Project") have helped immensely to reduce food problems. But, even though these organizations are helpful, more lasting solutions such as adequate irrigation systems and other self-help projects would be more desirable.

Inflation/Mismanagement

Africa also faces the problem of inflation exported by the West. Table 4 shows the distribution of technology flow to developing countries. In 1988, Africa's capital goods import was 17 billion dollars. The foreign-direct-investment flow of 2.1 billion dollars in the same year clearly indicates a trade imbalance. Africa is saturated with western goods, but prices for basic consumables are prohibitive. Also, the costs of providing basic amenities like electricity, potable water, and roads are equally alarming.




FIGURE 3. Cereal Food Aid Deliveries By Category ¹⁰

Table 3

World Bank food-gap scenarios in Africa, 1990-2020¹¹

Scenarios	1990	2000	2010	2020
Example I				
Population (millions of persons) (with constant fertility)	500	700	1,010	1,500
Food production (mtme)* (at current trend growth rate of 2% a year)	90	110	135	165
Food requirement (mtme for universal food security by 2020)	100	160	250	410
Food gap (mtme)	10	50	115	245
Example II				
Population (as in Example I)	500	700	1,010	1,500
Food production (at 4% annual growth)	90	135	200	300
Food requirement (as in Example I)	100	160	250	410
Food gap (as in Example I)	10	25	50	100
Example III				
Population (millions of persons) (with total fertility rate declining by 50% to 3.3 by 2020)	500	680	890	1,110
Food production (mtme at 4% annual growth)	90	135	200	300
Food requirement (mtme)	100	150	220	305
Food gap (mtme)	10	15	20	5

*Million tons maize equivalent

Africa's debt crises, the increasing costs of development technology, and refugee problems have all contributed to the high level of inflation. To compound this problem, some African leaders warmly embrace external economic saboteurs. In connivance with these saboteurs, they have completely ruined the African economy. In addition, some of the leaders have perfected methods that enable them to misuse state funds and divert some into private pockets. Economic mismanagement in connivance with foreign partners because of maladministration is rampant in Africa.¹²

Table 4

Distribution of technology flows to developing countries, 1988¹²
(in billions of dollars, current prices)

Region type of flow	Capital goods imports	Foreign-direct investment inflows	Technical cooperation grants
All developing countries	144	28.7	12.6 *
Africa	17	2.1	4.9
Asia	87	14.9	2.9
Latin America and the Caribbean	36	11.4	2
Memo: Least developed countries	4	0.1	2.6

* Grants not allocated to individual countries are included in total, but not in regional group.

The sum total, as remarked by Maurice Williams, is that--

African dependence on depressed commodity markets, has been, in addition to other fundamental problems: recurrent drought, chronic food shortage, rapidly growing population, weak management of investment and fiscal programs, and, as a result, increasingly high dependence on foreign aid."¹⁴

There is a checklist in Robert Rotberg's book, Africa in the 1990s and Beyond, which is applicable to the whole continent; it includes the following items:

- o Bad external terms of trade.
- o Rapid rise in external debt and debt servicing obligation relative to export earnings and GDP.
- o Weather.
- o Cost of war. (Countries subjected to systematic South African aggressions, destabilization, and the stage managing of dissident or proxy forces include Mozambique, Angola, Chad, Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia to mention a few.) Lack of infrastructure in terms of physical resources, knowledge and research to sustain growth of food production safely above the 3-3.5 percent population growth rate.)
- o Inappropriate response to the oil and interest rate shocks of 1979-80.
- o Widespread currency overvaluation which adversely affects exports and production of import substitutes.

- o State intervention in the economy and worsening performance of many public sector enterprises.

- o The uneven degrees of national solidarity, political system acceptability, and public policy operation of SSA states (Map 2).

- o Domestic discontent, up to and including both civil wars and violent changes in government.

- o Historic. (African states and economies are, with few exceptions, open and lack a well-articulated network of domestic intrasectoral.)

- o Historic. (Most SSA economies are small in terms both of population and of economic magnitude.)¹⁵

In the past, the impression has been that industrialized nations have either come to exploit Africa (as in the case of the SSA) or to repartition Africa for selfish purposes. This claim is reinforced by Dennis Austin in his article "Africa Repartitioned," which appears in Conflict Studies 193.¹⁶ Austin argues that "the outside world is drawing closer to Africa through the rivalry between the superpowers which threaten to divide the continent anew." However, with the demise of the Soviet Union, Austin's claim may no longer be valid, and Africa may now stand a better chance of receiving adequate help.

AFRICA

Scale: 1:48,000,000

0 500 1000 Kilometers
0 500 1000 Nautical Miles

Azimuthal Equal Area Projection

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Map 2. Political map of Africa.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency,
OIC Map Services Center, Washington, D.C., 1992

POLITICAL CRISES AND THEIR CAUSES

The state of political jingoism, which some African leaders want the world to believe exists, has been for a long time a cover-up of the seriousness of the political calamities these leaders are facing. From colonial rule to the present day, political instability has been a dominant problem. Some political problems are self-made; others are imposed by external factors. However, Africa should have learned to give full rein to its inborn adaptive capabilities (as called for by the current chairman of the OAU and the President of Africa's most populous nation--Nigeria) and forge a progressive political machination through a confident competitive role in the world economy and polity. Until then, Africa will continue to be afflicted with the many political problems caused by

- o Economic crises (already discussed)
- o Maladministration.
- o Unhealthy political rivalries.
- o Social decadence.
- o Leadership problems (lack of focus, objectives, goals, and direction on the part of the leaders).
- o Personal interests as against national/state interests and loyalty.
- o Nature.
- o Importation of foreign democracy (as against developing democracy peculiar to African states).

- o Religious differences.
- o Cultural, tribal, and language differences.
- o Boundary disputes.
- o Refugee problems.
- o Military intervention in political processes.

(Note: For this study, I have chosen not to discuss personal interests versus national interests, nature, and refugee problems.)

Maladministration

Maladministration and mismanagement have created great difficulties for African leaders. Stephen P. Riley, in his article, "African Debt and Western Interests,"¹⁷ argues that African states have a form of personal or patrimonial rule leading to the gradual and systematic accumulation of debt. He further observes that the state is usually the largest employer and biggest economic unit within societies--a style of rule that tends to lead to the misuse of state funds and their diversion into private pockets.¹⁸ Citing Zaire's debt as an example, Riley concludes that Zaire's 5 billion dollar debt must be connected to the extraordinary levels of corruption and maladministration within its government.¹⁹ Corruption and mismanagement, therefore, contribute to political crises in many African states. (Riley exempts President Nyerere of Tanzania and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana.)

Unhealthy Political Rivalries

Once in power, many African leaders hold tenaciously to political leadership of their states. Prominent among them were Seseke Mobutu of Zaire, Dr. Kwame Nkruma of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Emperor Haile Selaise of Ethiopia, Dr. Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Dr. Jomo Keyanta of Kenya, Sekou Ture of Guinea, and Ahmadu Ahijo of Cameroun.

These African leaders were dynamic, and they played useful and commendable roles in making Africa what it is today. But they all held power too long. Bitter struggles occurred between them and their political opponents resulting in chaos for the population. In such climates, unhealthy political rivalries, which normally start as internal problems, develop. Internal problems usually get out of control and become full-scale insurgencies. This type of political development is responsible for about 20 percent of insurgent activities in Africa.²⁰ Armed struggle and military crises account for the rest.

Besides leadership rivalries, the sudden increase in the number of independent African states has brought about factions based on ideologies or personal antagonisms such as the rivalry between the moderate Brazzaville group and the radical Casablanca group in the early 1960s. While the former rejected political integration and stressed the principles of sovereignty of states and noninterference,

the latter, led by late President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, urged a political union and the creation of a United States of Africa along federal lines under a high command.²¹

Rivalries still persist in many areas of Africa where intervention and domination are predominant. Many states are now beginning to get back on course.

Social Decadence

Social decadence is the direct result of economic crisis, maladministration, and unhealthy political rivalries. The most prevalent problem in this situation is loss of national and state identities. Law and order is broken and injustice prevails. Killing, corruption, armed robbery, tribalism, nepotism, embezzlement, and assassination are rampant. Unspeakable levels of social crimes prevail and the center no longer holds. It becomes difficult for a government to achieve stability under such conditions. The Liberian crisis is a recent example. Many social crimes were committed in Liberia before ECOMOG forces intervened to salvage what was left of the country. The conflicts in Chad, Togo, and Somalia are other examples.

Leadership Problems

Leadership problems are by far the most endemic cause of political instability in Africa. In the past, many African activists blamed leadership and political crises on external factors. They argued that some of the

early political activists were not politically mature enough at the time leadership roles were thrust upon them by the colonial powers. They, therefore, fell far short of competently managing African affairs.

Some contemporary African leaders now acknowledge that Africans are responsible for both the fortunes and the misfortunes of the continent. General Olusegun Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria, believes that Africa's salvation lies in the hands of its leaders and nowhere else. In his advice to the African Leadership Forum (ALF) at its inaugural meeting in November 1988, at Ota, Nigeria, he urged Africans to make their world a relevant part of the world by showing exemplary leadership in the continent.²²

The current chairman of the OAU and President of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, holds similar views. In his address to the ALF, he made the following appeal to Africans:

Lagging seriously behind in almost every human endeavor, we in Africa must be fully committed to a program of honest hard work relying on the sweats of our own labor, which will invariably ensure the attainment of our goals that center on the upliftment of the quality of life of our people.²³

However, there are factors (such as insecurity, poverty, politics, economies and social crises) which make it difficult for some leaders to "be fully committed to a program of honest work."

Importation of Foreign Democracy

Another stumbling block to African progress is the desire to import western democracy into Africa. Western democracy is no doubt the best system of government. It has survived the test of time and been embraced by a large percentage of global states. However, good as it is, there are aspects of democracy peculiar to western nations which cannot be applied to Africa without modification.

African norms and ethics are different from those of western nations. Its cultural and social traditions are not the same as those of western nations. For example, while African societies derive their strength from an extended family structure system, most western nations draw strength from a family structure which generally includes the husband, wife and their immediate children. However, children cease to be dependents at age 21. The extended African family structure has no age limit for dependency. Each person stays within the family as long as he lives. Polygamy is also common within African societies regardless of religious beliefs.

Other factors are equally responsible for ideological differences between western nations and African societies. For example, since Africans cannot understand western culture in the way westerners do, it is difficult for them to understand western democracy and practice it the way westerners do. If there is to be democracy in

Africa, it must be formulated to work in Africa. Builders of such a democracy would have to take into consideration the culture, norms, ethics, beliefs, and strength of African societies.

Religious Differences

One of the most volatile and explosive political destabilizers in Africa today is religion. However, religious differences serving as catalysts to political crises is not peculiar to African. From the beginning of civilization, religion has caused major political crises within and between nations. Nearly every African state has at least one political problem which has emanated from religious differences. Unfortunately, some political leaders hide within the religious sects to gain dominance and power.

Cultural, Tribal, and Language Differences

Extended families are usually unique ethnic groups having common cultural practices and linguistic affiliations. The supportive nature of the extended family structure and each ethnic group's common culture and language cohesively bonds it together. This cohesive bond makes it possible for each ethnic group to have one voice and one course. A large number of such different groups are often of concern to African leaders. Religion and ethnic identity bear on people's beliefs, and the combination usually brings devastating destabilizing

problems to African politics. Such combinations often result in insurgency and civil wars (as in Nigeria in 1967 and in Chad, Sudan, Liberia, and Somalia).

Earl Conteh-Morgan, in Trans Africa Forum,²⁴ argues that irredentist movements, border clashes, antigovernment activities, and ethnic and religious rivalries often lead to increased demand for military assistance. Just as his argument is true for Nigeria, it is true for Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Togo.

Boundary Disputes

As argued by Conteh-Morgan, boundary disputes resulting in border clashes also explain one reason for political and military crises in Africa. However, boundary disputes in Africa are largely a legacy of the colonial era. In the late Nineteenth Century, when the colonial powers of France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK drew up the boundaries of modern Africa, they paid little heed to natural and geographic boundaries or to the ties of the inhabitants of these territories.²⁵ The frontiers were artificially delineated, in many cases dividing ethnic groups or bringing together rival groups, thereby sowing the seeds of future conflict.²⁶

Recently, many African states have clashed because of boundary adjustments. And, some states still lock horns in what seems to be an endless struggle. Prominent among these clashes are the following disputes:

- o Algerian-Moroccan Border Dispute (1963 to 1969).
- o Somali-Ethiopian-Kenyan dispute (1964 to 1988).
- o Mali-Burkina Faso dispute (1974).
- o Nigeria-Cameroun dispute (1970 to date).²⁷

The Algerian-Moroccan border dispute was based on the lack of a defined common border after decolonization. Differing ideologies compounded the problem. For example, Algeria was a revolutionary socialist regime which had won its independence through war but which adhered to the traditional legal concepts on the acquisition of territory. Morocco was a conservative monarchy which had peaceably gained its independence, but its relationship with neighboring territories was motivated by irredentist claims based on Islamic concepts.²⁸

Unlike the Algerian-Moroccan dispute, the origins of the dispute between Somali, Ethiopia, and Kenya were based on ethnic differences. Large numbers of Somalis lived in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and in the northern Kenya area which Somalia wished to annex. The result was hostility.

In Burkina Faso, census officials from Ouagadougou, the capital, attempted to count the inhabitants of villages who the Malians claimed were their citizens.²⁹ This resulted in a clash that started in 1974. No resolution has been found to this dispute by the International Court where the case was sent for settlement.

The boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun was brought about by the British colonial leaders. The boundary has shifted between the two states a couple of times. Then in 1961, British Cameroun (administered as part of Nigeria) was divided north and south, and its inhabitants were asked to vote in a UN plebiscite. The north chose to remain with Nigeria who lamented the loss of the south to Cameroun. Since 1970, clashes have continued to occur in the disputed area.³⁰

Other conflicts are between Ghana and Togo and Liberia and her neighbors. Ghana's conflicts with Togo originated from the unwillingness of the Ewe people to accept the European imperialist fiat in 1890 that divided them into "German Togo" and "British Gold Coast" and from having had to affirm, through a 1956 UN plebiscite, their division between modern Ghana and Togo.³¹ Liberia on the other hand had problems of leadership recognition by neighboring states after Master Sergeant Samuel Doe's coup. Notable among Liberia's disenchanted neighbors are Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Nigeria, Togo, and Senegal.³²

In sum, these conflicts usually result in continuing political instability. A serious side effect of these conflicts is the increase of combat arms importation.

Refugee Problems

Refugee problems play a significant role in destabilizing African politics. Military clashes have left many Africans homeless. Frequent forays by South Africa into the frontline states (Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, and Angola) and the frequent conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Horn have increased refugees to an alarming level.³³ The plight of such refugees is, perhaps, one of the most overwhelming tragedies in Africa. Present numbers fluctuate from between 4 to 5 million people, despite the effort of governments and voluntary organizations to relieve their suffering. The scale of the problem remains staggering.

Every day, more refugees flee from crises in Chad, Sudan, and Somalia. The enormous problems created by the refugee situation weigh heavily on the ability of African leaders to focus attention on other issues.³⁴ Table 5 is based on the World Refugee Survey-1989 In Review.³⁵ It shows the state-by-state statistical summary of Africa's refugees as of October 1990.

MILITARY CRISES AND THEIR CAUSES

Military Intervention in Political Processes

At the moment, military crises are the most destabilizing problem in African politics. Because of its important nature, I have divided the subject into the following topics:

Table 5

AFRICA'S refugees: A country-by-country statistical summary^{3 6}

Country/ Asylum	Source country subtotals	Total
Ethiopia		740,000
Sudan	385,000	
Somalia	355,000	
Gabon		100
Ghana		100
Guinea		280
Liberia	280,000	
Kenya		15,500
Uganda	6,400	
Somalia	3,000	
Ethiopia	2,800	
Rwanda	2,000	
Others	1,300	
Lesotho		4,000
South Africa	4,000	
Liberia		200
Malawi		812,000
Mozambique	812,000	
Mauritania		22,000
Senegal	22,000	
Morocco		800
Mozambique		400
South Africa	200	
Others	200	
Namibia		25,000
Angola	25,000	
Nigeria		5,100
Chad	4,000	
Others	1,100	
Rwanda		20,500
Burundi	20,500	
Senegal		48,000
Mauritania	43,000	
Guinea-Bissau	4,800	
Others	200	
Sierra Leone		70,000
Liberia	70,000	
Somalia		350,000
Ethiopia	350,000	
South Africa		201,000
Mozambique	200,000	
Lesotho	1,000	

Table 5. Continued

Country/ Asylum	Source country subtotals	Total
Sudan		694,300
Ethiopia	663,200	
Chad	24,000	
Aire	5,000	
Uganda	2,000	
Swaziland		266,200
Mozambique	65,000	
South Africa	6,700	
Tanzania		266,200
Burundi	156,000	
Mozambique	72,000	
Rwanda	21,000	
Zaire	16,000	
Others	1,200	
Togo		500
Ghana	400	
Others	100	
Tunisia		200
Uganda		170,500
Rwanda	118,000	
Sudan	50,000	
Zaire	1,000	
Others	1,500	
Zaire		338,800
Angola	311,500	
Rwanda	12,000	
Burundi	10,000	
Uganda	4,000	
Others	1,300	
Zambia		131,700
Angola	97,000	
Mozambique	20,000	
Zaire	9,000	
South Africa	3,200	
Others	2,500	
Zimbabwe		185,500*
Mozambique	185,000	
South Africa	500	
TOTAL AFRICA		5,006,700

- o Military coups d'etat.
- o Military conflicts.
- o External interventionism.
- o Arming of Africa.

Coups D'etat:

Much has been written on the causes of coups d'etat, the nature of civil-military relations, military-state relations, and military rule and performance in Africa. However, little has been written on the frequency of military intervention and its effect on Africa. Table 6 shows the frequency of coups d'etat in West African states between 1960 and 1991. Although this sub-region is noted for frequent regime changes and insurgent activities, other African nations like Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Zaire have also had their share of frequent coups d'etat.

The persistent military coups which began in the early 1960s contribute to the fear and sense of insecurity prevalent among African leaders. For example, the resentment felt toward Master Sergeant Samuel Doe after his successful coup d'etat in Liberia is connected with the fact that neighboring states were afraid such success might influence or trigger similar actions within their own states. Likewise, when there is a coup d'etat in Nigeria, Benin Republic becomes terrified and insecure because it fears such coups could become infectuous. Crises between

Table 6

Coups d'etat in West African states, 1960-1991³⁷

<u>Successful coups</u>	<u>Failed coups</u>	<u>No coups</u>
Nigeria (5)*	The Gambia (1)	Senegal
Ghana (5)		Côte d'Ivoire
Togo (3)**		Cape Verde
Mali (2)		
Burkina Faso (5)*		
Niger (1)		
Guinea (1)		
Benin (6)		
Sierra Leone (3)**		
Liberia (1)		
Mauritanaia (3)		
Guinea-Bissau (1)		

* Figures in parenthesis denote number of coups

** Latest coups in Togo and Sierra Leone are included

Tanzania and Uganda, trigger similar fear, because nations wracked by military coups d'etat suffer numerous political setbacks.

Military Conflicts and External Interventionism


Most often, when there is a military coup d'etat in Africa, an accompanying military conflict follows. As a result of the numerous coups d'etat, therefore, there have been several military conflicts in Africa. Most prominent among them were the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970); the Tanzania-Uganda war; and the Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Liberia, and Somalia civil wars. The following two case studies demonstrate how insurgencies in these states engulfed Africa. However, such situations are not peculiar to Africa alone. Table 7 lists other nations still at war.

The Tanzania-Uganda War (Maps 3 and 4). When Idi Amin captured the reins of government from Milton Obote in 1971, his military coup was welcomed by thousands of rejoicing people who thronged the streets of Kampala. However, Julius Nyerere, Amin's would-be next door neighbor, saw the coup as destabilizing and completely undemocratic. Nyerere was also sympathetic to his good friend Milton Obote who had been wisked out of office.³⁸ Nyerere became determined to get rid of Amin, and seven years later, when he became President of Tanzania, he was vindicated in his belief that Amin was evil. Amnesty


Table 7

A world still at war³⁹

Country	Number of 1991 deaths	Source of conflict
Afghanistan	2,000	Islamic rebels fighting each other, as well as leftist government.
Burma (Myanmar)	5,000	Ethnic minorities battling military dictatorship along borders. Nobel winner still imprisoned.
India	6,500	Sikhs in Punjab and Muslims in Kashmir want independence from government.
Mozambique	2,000	Rightist rebels continue to battle formerly Marxist government in 17-year war.
Somalia	20,000	Rival clans battling for power kill many civilian as well as each other in fierce fight for capital.
Sri Lanka	11,000	Hindu Tamil Tigers fighting guerrilla war against army of Buddhist Sinhalese majority.
Sudan	2,000	Islamic fundamentalist military government fights black rebels in southern Sudan.
Yugoslavia	6,000	Croats and Serbs still battle over Croatia independence, despite UN sponsored cease-fire.



Map 3. Tanzania.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency,
OIC Map Services Center, Washington, D.C., 1992



Map 4. Uganda.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency,
OIC Map Services Center, Washington, D.C., 1992

International published a damning report on Amin's regime which seemed to confirm the horrific stories that had been filtering out of Uganda since the earliest days of his rule.⁴⁰

Tension mounted between the neighboring countries and accusations and counter-accusations of invasion became frequent. In October 1978, the invasion force Amin sent into Kagera Salient (a city belonging to Tanzania) in hot pursuit of disloyal Ugandan troops not only got more than they bargained for from Nyerere but gave Nyerere a greater voice to convince the world that Amin's activities were atrocious and must be stopped.

Appeals to Amin by the US to withdraw from Tanzanian territory fell on deaf ears. Also, the OAU and other African states were not ready to condemn Amin for his actions. Nyerere, frustrated by this situation, launched his own offensive. Unfortunately, this initiative was not taken by Nyerere until Amin had been pressured by African leaders, Arab countries, and the Soviet Union to withdraw from Kagera.⁴¹


Nyerere's plan included allowing Tanzania as a base for training Uganda dissidents. With adequate support and encouragement, he launched them across the border to destroy Amin. Nyerere's intentions were to pursue and

punish the troops Amin had sent to Kagera and to aid and abet the toppling of Amin from power.

Nyerere gave uniforms and equipment to the 900 Obote supporters he had been training.⁴² On April 10, 1977, with Tanzania forces leading the attack, Uganda finally fell before the onslaught of Tanzanian troops and exile forces.

Chad's Crisis. In 1970 the deterioration of Chad's internal divisions into internal warfare made it the prey of foreign powers rivaling for influence in Africa.⁴³ Chad's relations with France seriously deteriorated in early 1977 primarily due to the Claustre affair. General Malloun (the man in charge at that time) resented France's bilateral negotiations with the rebels and with Libya to secure their release. Malloun accused France of undue interference in Chad's internal affairs and ordered the withdrawal of French military personnel in 1976.⁴⁴ (See also Map 5.)

In 1977, the US which had remained at the periphery of Chad's internal war, began to take greater interest in the developments there. This burgeoning US interest may be explained by the positive reports of Chadian oil wealth in the region of Lake Chad, threats of Libyan expansion, and an expanding US strategic concern with Egypt and Sudan. The US was no longer content to remain at the periphery.⁴⁵



Map 5. Chad.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency,
OIC Map Services Center, Washington, D.C., 1992

The situation was further compounded by the teaming up of the Goukodni faction with Libya against Habré.⁴⁶ The US's actions and the pressure from Chad's neighbors encouraged the former colonial power to commit itself once again to a military posture. "Operation Manta" conducted by French troops two months later ended the fighting and created a stalemate which is still simmering beneath the lid of a false calm.

These examples show how internal African military conflicts, compounded by internal and external intervention, can disrupt any political system no matter how tested or cohesive it is. If there had been no military coups resulting in military conflicts and interventions, the states now facing political and economic crises might instead be enjoying peace.

Arming of Africa. In Africa, the key political trend since 1960 has been the rising incidents of intra-regional conflicts and superpower competition. This has triggered a gradual arms race and strengthened the political inclination of African nations to increase military expenditure.⁴⁷ It is also partly responsible for the frequent military conflicts in Africa, such as the Congo crisis in the early 1960s, the Nigerian Civil War already mentioned, the Angolan wars, the on-going conflicts in the Horn and Liberia, the Shaba incidents of 1977 and 1978, the protracted Chadian Civil War, the Western Sahara

conflict of the 1980s, and the various guerrilla movements in Southern Africa.⁴⁸ Three factors explain the increase in arms imports by African states:

- o African countries do not possess an arms industry and, therefore, have to import arms.

- o Present purchases appear significant in terms of level and rate of increase, because there was no arms importation before independence.

- o Mid-1970s superpower competition in the region increased arms transfers and created the appearance of a high level of arms acquisition.⁴⁹

The major arms suppliers are the Soviet Union, France, Italy, Germany, and the US. These arms transfers, whether as commercial sales or military assistance, benefit the supplier in two ways: its economy is enhanced and it gains leverage over the recipient country.⁵⁰

Furthermore, African military expenditure is closely linked with Soviet-American rivalry.

After the Soviet Union entered the global arms market in 1954, competition between the two superpowers intensified, resulting in accelerated arms export to African countries.⁵¹ Irrespective of why, Africa has always and will always be the worst for arms transfers. While suppliers benefit greatly, Africans use the arms to kill themselves, keeping Africa destabilized politically and economically.

REMEDIES

Africa has been making efforts to solve its problems. Developed nations have also been willing to make reasonable contributions to rescue the situation. Africa, like Czechoslovakia and some European nations presently facing political and economic hardship, desperately needs friendly and timely help. Africa needs trusted friends within the developed nations to salvage its economy.

Some reform programs, although constrained by the debt crises, are in progress. Between 1985 and 1986, African leaders, seemingly for the first time, saw the need to redirect development priorities and comprehensive structural reform of their economies to bring them in line with the World Bank initiative of redirecting programs to support African structural adjustment.⁵²

By the end of 1990, most African nation debtors had engaged in at least one form of structural adjustment program or another imposed on them by their creditors. These creditors (because of the huge debt owed them by Africa) have considerable leverage to dictate what the debtors (Africa) can or cannot do.

Western governments, who were initially slow or refused to recognize the seriousness of Africa's debt crises, have now begun to see the implications of not keeping African debt under control. Canada, the UK, and France have taken the lead in this direction. The US has

also been helpful. If current US policies of debt relief, debt forgiveness, and the pressure on the World Bank to develop a more positive approach toward Africa debt repayment are implemented, Africa will see some relief.

Other initiatives taken toward relieving Africa of debts include President Mitterrand's promise to prepare a bill which would extend debt forgiveness for the approval of the French parliament. He kept his promise. In January 1991, Japan launched a debt-relief initiative by pledging a 200 million dollar balance of payment credit for Nigeria. It also announced a program to recycle over three years 30 billion dollars in loans to Third World countries."⁵³ At about the same time, Germany announced it would write off 8 billion deutsche marks (DM) owed by African states. Canada and Italy followed with commitments to debt forgiveness.⁵⁴ Table 8 charts the amount of loan repayments in developing countries between 1986 and 1991. Comparing this table with Table 1 shows a high rate of borrowing against a low repayment rate. This will not help relieve Africa's debt crises.

So far, I have highlighted chronic economic, political, and military crises in Africa. I have also discussed efforts made to contain them. Unfortunately, problems persist. This is partly caused by the inherent structure of the problem and partly by the fact that when

REPAYMENT OF LOANS

	1990				1991				1992			
	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	I	II	III	July	Aug	Sept	Oct
Expressed in Millions of SDRs												
	336.9	550.2	502.5	400.3	270.0	42.6	8.0	-	-	-	-	-
	336.8	550.2	502.5	400.3	269.9	42.6	8.0	-	-	-	-	-
	175.4	156.8	137.3	104.5	38.8	2.6	.9	-	-	-	-	-
	2.5	2.5	2.3	1.5	1.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2.5	2.5	2.3	1.5	.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	3.7	3.6	3.2	2.1	.1	.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
	6.8	6.8	6.2	3.9	1.1	.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2.5	2.5	2.3	1.5	.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1.1	1.1	.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	10.1	10.1	10.1	5.8	3.2	-	.2	-	-	-	-	-
	.9	.9	.9	.9	.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	5.3	5.3	5.3	3.0	.8	.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2.0	1.4	1.2	.8	.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	9.7	9.7	9.7	8.6	2.6	.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
	4.7	4.7	4.0	2.7	.7	-	.1	-	-	-	-	-
	9.0	9.1	8.0	4.8	1.5	.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1.0	1.0	.6	.6	.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	5.1	5.1	4.6	2.9	2.9	.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2.9	2.9	2.5	1.7	.5	.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
	4.3	4.3	3.9	2.5	.7	-	.1	-	-	-	-	-
	2.5	2.5	2.2	1.3	.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1.6	1.6	1.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	22.0	21.3	18.6	11.2	3.4	.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2.5	2.5	2.5	1.5	1.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	.6	.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
	6.6	6.6	6.0	3.8	1.0	.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
	8.0	1.3	-	.3	1.8	-	.1	-	-	-	-	-
	2.1	2.1	-	.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	.9	.9	.9	.9	.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	12.3	8.0	7.0	4.7	1.3	-	.2	-	-	-	-	-
	2.9	2.9	2.7	1.7	.5	-	.1	-	-	-	-	-
	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	2.4	.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
	22.0	21.4	18.6	12.6	3.4	.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
	8.5	2.8	-	13.8	3.6	.3	-	-	-	-	-	-

the world's economy suffers, more often than not, Africa's is worse.

However, Africa cannot continue to hide under excuses. General Ibrahim Babangida, Chairman of the OAU and Nigeria's President, in his advise to ALF in Lagos, Nigeria, in November 1988, stated--

We in Africa must quickly learn to give full reins to our inborn adaptive and creative technological capabilities. We must strive toward the minimization of income differentials among our peoples through an efficient and progressive system of taxation, through an open and publicly accountable bureaucracy, through the promotion and sustenance of our own cultural identity, and through a confident competitive role in the world's economy and polity.⁵⁶

Africa must return to fundamentals and take critical stock of events giving rise to its ongoing problems. It must look inward and formulate new approaches to resolve old problems. Even though industrialization and technological development would help Africa's economy, a politically and militarily stable Africa would help even more. An effective JCMFA would be able to create this desired stable atmosphere.

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CHAPTER 3

JCMFA DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. It is a collision of two living forces and not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass.

Karl von Clausewitz, On War¹

Karl von Clausewitz states that "physical force" is the means of war designed to compel the will of the strong on the weak. To him, moral force has no meaning; it does not exist. Therefore, he argues, to disarm the enemy by maximum exertion of strength we must not only be militarily strong, but we must be physically and mentally overwhelming. Other great theorists such as Jomini, Mahan, and Mao have similar views.

Throughout history nations have survived by sheer physical force. Such nations include the Roman Empire under Julius Ceaser, France under Napoleon, Hitler's Germany, and Britain at the Falkland Islands, the Soviet Union until its fall, and the United States. The way to interpret this is that military strength and its projection is desirable for survival. Africa is docile in this regard. But Africa needs the physical force to survive. Therefore, it is necessary for Africa to establish a

coalition force capable of responding to the needs of the region.

In this chapter, I discuss JCMFA doctrine with a quick overview of Africa's goals, objectives, and interests. I also provide brief case studies of US military doctrine, Israeli political-military doctrine, and Soviet military doctrine.

What is doctrine? Raymond L. Garthoff, in Soviet Military Doctrine,² defines military doctrine as the basic assumptions, fundamental principles, and methods of achieving a nation's political objectives by military means. He also suggests that (under the guiding influence of doctrine) strategy and tactics, weapons systems, and training and discipline contribute to the attainment of objectives sought. John L. Romjue, in From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982,³ views doctrine at the tactical level. By his definition, doctrine generally describes how the Army fights tactically, how tactics and weapons systems are integrated, how command and control and combat service support are provided, and how forces are mobilized, trained, deployed, and employed.

United States Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations,⁴ gives what can be described as the most comprehensive definition of doctrine. By this definition, an army's fundamental doctrine is the condensed expression

of its approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. Tactics, techniques, procedures, organizations, support structure, equipment, and training must all derive from it. Doctrine must be rooted in time-tested theories and principles, yet forward-looking and adaptable to changing technologies, threats, and missions. It must be definitive enough to guide operations, yet versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of worldwide situations. Finally, to be useful it must be uniformly known and understood.

AFRICA'S INTERESTS, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES

One common factor in all the definitions of doctrine is how doctrine evolves from national goals, interests, and objectives. To discuss a doctrine for the JCMFA, therefore, it is desirable to know Africa's interests, goals, and objectives. Without doubt, the establishment of a JCMFA would involve multistate participation. However, each independent state has peculiar social, cultural, military, and political indicators. In addition, each has experienced different types of colonial indoctrination which has shaped their thinking and viewpoints. Therefore, even though they share the same economic difficulties, the differences in their ideologies and other indicators could be a source of discussion or conflict. In spite of such divergencies, however, each has the same regional issues: political,

economic, military, and social. These issues are explained in detail in the OAU charter.⁵ Highlights include--

- o Interests--

- The survival of Africa as a free and independent region, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

- An economically self-sufficient region.

- A stable and secure region, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.⁶

- o Goals--

- Political and diplomatic cooperation among African States.

- Economic cooperation, including transport and communications.

- Scientific and technical cooperation.

- Cooperation for defense and security.⁷

- o Objectives--

- To promote the unity and solidarity of African states.

- To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.

- To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations⁸ and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁹

One conclusion that can be drawn from the definitions of doctrine is that doctrine varies greatly from one armed service to another and from one nation to the next.

Hence, doctrine represents the political thinking and the state of affairs of each nation. Therefore, doctrine is a guide to warfare, yet the goals, objectives, and interests of each sovereign state determine the scope of the guide. The conclusion, then, is that a doctrine which will address the issue of the survival of Africa and ensure a stable, secure region must be able to ensure the defense and security of the region. However, any viable doctrine must consider the impact on society and culture.

The promotion of unity and solidarity of African states is one of the regional objectives in Africa. This objective is closely related to the goal of political and diplomatic cooperation among African states. To achieve of these goals and objectives, Africa must create a social and cultural atmosphere within which military doctrine can thrive. Today Africa is fighting economic, political, and social wars. Its doctrine must be able to withstand these controversies and achieve the victory of stability.

DOCTRINE COMPARISONS

To develop a doctrine that is consistent with the interests, goals, and objectives of Africa while also addressing the specific problems of economic, political, social, and military crises, Africa's leaders should look at those that have been developed for other countries and use them as a basis for a doctrine which would solve Africa's unique problems.

US Military Doctrine

AirLand Battle (ALB). After the Vietnam conflict and before the fall of the Berlin Wall, US doctrinal reformers argued that the US was overly reliant on heavy divisions and firepower, cumbersome aircraft carrier battle groups, and complex tactical air forces that could prove unreliable in combat.¹⁰ They called for doctrinal changes to address those shortfalls. The new doctrine is now known as AirLand Battle.

AirLand Battle Doctrine is based on a linear battlefield (that is, a battlefield with a known front and a known enemy). Developed in the late 1970s, its initial emphasis was on controlling a constant flow of Soviet echelons across a battle line. In its simplest form, ALB describes how a smaller force can use all of its tactical assets to defeat a numerically superior opponent. It reflects the structure of modern warfare, the dynamics of combat power, and the application of classical principles of war to contemporary battlefield requirements.¹¹ Specifically, ALB Doctrine focuses on mid- to high-intensity warfare. Its tenets also apply to military operations characterized by low-intensity conflict (LIC).¹²

While ALB Doctrine is a workable and successful doctrine, the changing world order has again dictated its review. The arenas of high-intensity conflict and nuclear

warfare, for which ALB Doctrine was designed, are rapidly disappearing. Low-intensity conflicts and drug wars have become the new frontier. To successfully control the new frontier, the US is again renewing its doctrine. The new strategy is called AirLand Battle Future (ALBF).

AirLand Battle Future (ALBF). AirLand Battle Future Doctrine envisions shifting from a defensive posture to an offensive posture and places greater demands on sensor and deep-strike weapons technology. It envisions fighting future wars over wider spaces at an everquickening pace but with fewer troops equipped with highly sophisticated weapons. Because there may no longer be an enemy directly in front as it used to be, the new doctrine would have to be based on a concept of nonlinearity; that is, a battlefield with no front line.

The lessons to be learned from US doctrine policies is constantly reacting to the changing world order by developing a doctrine that will ensure the realization of its interests, goals, and objectives at all times.

Although Africa has never had a unified doctrine, the US example clearly shows the need for a defensive doctrine capable of fostering a stable and secure region devoid of internal and external interventionism.

Israel's Political-Military Doctrine

Israel's military doctrine evolved from its religious, geographic, and political position in the Middle East. Until June 1967, Israel occupied an area of 7,992 square miles with a border length of about 774 miles (615 miles on land and 159 miles on sea). This "vast disproportion between the length of the borders and the depth of the country, turn[ed] the nation into a frontier state."¹³ Today, Israel's neighbors include Syria on the Golan Heights, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and the West Bank. Religious conflicts stem from its central location between Arab states who are predominantly Muslims. The religious disparity, therefore, frequently causes armed hostilities between Israel and its neighbors. Therefore, Israel is in a permanent state of war.

Against this background, and with a population of about 3 million Jews against 55 million Arabs, political leaders and military thinkers decided to train every able Israeli to fight.¹⁴ The first phase of this Israeli doctrine was the concept of a reserve system.¹⁵ After finishing compulsory service, every citizen would be transferred to a reserve unit where he would train for 45 days every year. The next phase was to develop a strategy of moving the war into the enemy's territory.

While these concepts were being refined, Israel continued to be attacked. Terrorist activities became

rampant. In response, Israel adopted a reprisal and retaliation posture meant to deter aggression. These and related military crises were responsible for the subsequent offensive doctrine adopted by Israel.¹⁶

Like Israel, Africa is besieged with internal crises ranging from religion to ethnicity. The problems have often given rise to military crises. Therefore, a doctrine of deterrence is feasible to ensure that while interventionism is forbidden, mediation is allowed. Realizing that the use of force was possible by a capable JCMFA, aggression would be deterred within and between African states. The interests of ensuring a stable and secure region would then be guaranteed.

Soviet Military Doctrine

In the early 1920s, Soviet military doctrine was presented as a system of views for building up socialist armed forces, preparing them for war, and developing military art.¹⁷ Soviet doctrine was based on a military model of political relations derived from the fundamental Bolshevik conflict-image of the world.¹⁸ Bolshevism originated as a revolutionary movement with a distinctive image of political relations. In the Bolshevik view, the normal expectation was struggle, a complete struggle to the death between the Bolshevik Party as the vanguard of the oppressed and the capitalist--imperialist oppressors. This model, oriented on the view of destroy or be destroyed,

pervaded not only Soviet politics, but all of Soviet life.¹⁹ It accepted completely Clausewitz' idea that "war is the continuation of politics by other means."²⁰ Lenin and Stalin, while sharing the same view with Clausewitz, stressed that Soviet doctrine shoe go far beyond Clausewitz' idea of a different and supplementary conception of international politics. As a result, while endorsing and vigorously pursuing a policy of direct and intimate connection between peacetime and wartime relations, Soviet policy presumed permanent conflict even in peace.²¹ Shaposhnikov, a Soviet military authority, declared "If war is a continuation of politics only by other means, so also peace is a continuation of struggle only by other means."²²

Lenin also once wrote that "War is the continuation of that same (peacetime) policy with the entry of those changes in the relation of opposed forces which are created by military action."²³ Furthermore, he wrote, "War is at the core of politics..." and "war is a part of the whole; that whole is politics."²⁴ In that sense, the distinction between peace and war is obliterated, except for the difference in the degree of armed force used in the perpetual conflict.²⁵

Paradoxically, war was not a goal of Soviet strategy; the Soviets preferred to gain their objectives by pacific means--forcing appeasement on the enemy.²⁶ This

consideration influenced the Soviets to consider long term trends and possibilities when determining what risks were worth taking in the short run. Thus, the Soviet army was generally offensively employed only in situations in which other methods of lesser risk were not considered feasible, but in which a considerable potential for advance was calculated to exist.²⁷

Some Soviet theorists believe that military strategy is part of political strategy. The aims of political strategy, they argued, are also the aims of military strategy. Therefore, military and political strategies were forms of "Soviet strategy" as a whole. Also, questions of military, political, and economic strategy were closely woven into a unified whole.²⁸

The lessons learned from Soviet doctrine is that Africa must adequately study and formulate a workable doctrine. The Soviet doctrine process was so complex that its application became unrealistic. Hence, it became too dogmatic and, therefore, ineffective. It was also too rigid and was prone to problems in a fast-changing world.

JCMFA Doctrine

All of the examples cited here clearly show that formulating effective doctrine for the JCMFA must evolve from the interests, goals, and objectives of Africa. Effective JCMFA doctrine must pay specific attention to resolving prevalent African problems. These examples also

narrow the scope of JCMFA's options to defensive and deterrent doctrines. However, developing military doctrine is not easy, and no one individual can write a doctrine for a problematic region like Africa. Doctrine writers must be historians, digging for useful insights about regional or state purposes from the past, while also being futurists capable of anticipating battlefield conditions, predicting how wars will be fought, and marshaling forces to fight them. Doctrine writers must lay a clear, solid foundation for the JCMFA.

Considerations. Against this background, my personal suggestions might seem forward, but I feel they deserve consideration. My first suggestion is the establishment of a defensive doctrine for the JCMFA. A defensive doctrine, by definition, aims to deny an adversary the objective which he seeks. Therefore, a defensive doctrine would be desirable, because of the roles the JCMFA would be expected to perform. The JCMFA--

- o Would not be set up to police Africa or become a part of any global police force. It would be used to resolve regional African crises.

- o Would not be an intervention force. It would constitute a peacekeeping force by way of mediation into African crises (with the mandate of the OAU and the UN).

- o Would not have any ambitions of territorial or regional expansion. Its activities would be limited within regional boundaries.

- o Would be responsive rather than being the first use of force.

- c Would cooperate with all UN peacekeeping efforts to ensure a secure and stable free world.

- o Would exercise and train its forces toward a defensive posture.

My next suggestion is the establishment of deterrence doctrine aimed at punishing aggressors. A deterrence doctrine would give JCMFA the ability to perform the following roles:

- o Mediation into internal crises in Africa.

- o Resisting external intervention in African to reduce foreign military influences in Africa.

When formulating doctrine, leaders should try to achieve an effective balance of postures. While closely held defensive doctrine normally contributes to limited action by the aggressor, true defensive/deterrent doctrine, when backed up by an appropriate force structure, limits the possibilities of misperception and overreaction.

Although the establishment of the JCMFA would be designed to solve some of the economic problems, the doctrine should not be so narrow that it would apply only to economics.

Rather, a comprehensive perspective of all the problems would have to be considered.

Problems and Challenges. Since writing doctrine is difficult, it is expected that there would be accompanying problems and challenges. Some of the problems that leaders would include the following:

- o Limited experience in the art of developing doctrine. Few armed forces in Africa today have doctrines. If the JCMFA is established, the doctrine writing team would have to be drawn from members of these African armed forces. The lack of experience in writing doctrine would certainly be a problem.

- o If a dedicated team was not gathered, it would be difficult to derive sound doctrine.

- o Difficulties might arise in adequately defining workable doctrine.

- o Sabotage could make comprehensive work difficult.

- o The JCMFA's Role in the world community might not be easily defined.

Some challenges associated with writing JCMFA doctrine include the following:

- o All the problems above must be addressed by the writing team.

- o There must be extensive study of the three examples given in this paper as well as of current world doctrines. Understanding why such doctrines are successful or

unsuccessful would help writers formulate a lasting doctrine for the JCMFA.

- o A good understanding of the relationship between regional defense strategy and regional purpose is paramount. This would help in understanding what defense forces would do to preserve regional interests, goals, and objectives.

- o Doctrine must understand that doctrine is calibrated to the tactics of the enemy as well as the "strength" of one's own military forces. The word "strength" should be given a broad interpretation to include alignment, technology, and military hardware (not just men and logistic support).

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CHAPTER 4

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JCMFA

Our life was but a battle and a march, and like
the winds blast, never-resting, homeless, we stand
across the war convulsed health.

Fredrick von Schiller¹

THE HISTORY OF MODERN UNIFIED FORCES

The UN and the OAU

On May 25, 1963, at a conference of 30 heads of states and government meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the independent states of Africa adopted the constituent charter of a new international body--the Organization of African Unity (OAU).² The Charter has two main characteristics: it defines Africa as including all of the continental African states, the island of Madagascar, and all the islands surrounding Africa, and it declares the inalienable right of all Africans to control their own destiny and recognizes their aspirations for brotherhood and solidarity in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences.³

Article 2 of the Charter states in part, that "the member states (of the OAU) shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies, especially in cooperation for defense and security."⁴ Article 51 of the UN Charter

states that joint action is justified by the inherent, individual, and collective right of self-defense with the agreement that measures taken under the terms of the Article shall be terminated when the Security Council of the UN has acted as necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.⁵

NATO was created within the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter, and ECOMOG was established by Article 2 of the OAU charter. By implication, the precedences laid down by the creation of NATO and ECOMOG justify an argument for the establishment of the JCMFA. Therefore, the charters of both the OAU and the UN legally allow the establishment.

NATO

In 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union came out of WWII with greater scope for influencing events in Europe than ever before.⁶ Western Europe was too economically and militarily devastated to be in any position to respond to the assertion of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. France was only concerned with preventing German aggression and was also severely weakened from the ravages of war. The United Kingdom was so economically and politically weak that it was forced to borrow 5 billion dollars from the United States and Canada.⁷ The Soviet Union clearly possessed the strength to exert a profound influence over future military, political, and economic

developments in Europe. The US on the other hand, emerged from the war with a strengthened economy and the capacity to challenge any Soviet attempts to dominate Europe.

Although, the West and the Soviet Union had been wartime allies, with time it became increasingly difficult for the West to accept Soviet behavior with equanimity. The imposition of communist regimes coupled with the systematic elimination of opposition parties throughout Eastern Europe and the failure of the four-powers Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 1947, convinced the UK Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin that concerted Western action was essential.⁸ This led to the Brussels Treaty signed by France, the UK, and the Benelux nations on March 17, 1948.⁹

On June 11, 1948, the "Vandenberg Resolution" was adopted by the US Senate, making it possible for the acceptance of a US military alliance with Western Europe.¹⁰ On April 4, 1949, the NATO treaty was signed in Washington by 12 founding members--the US, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the UK.¹¹

NATO has a long list of achievements. It--

- o Served as a deterrent to Soviet aggression in Europe and in other parts of the world (except in Afghanistan).

- o Fostered mutual cooperation and development among member nations.

- o Encouraged arms control.
- o Furthered economic cooperation (as in the EEC).
- o Promoted West and East German unification after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
- o Contributed to the decline of communism, after the fall of the Soviet Union.
- o Provided military support during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield.
- o Made Europe and the West stronger in today's political, economic, and military arenas.

ECOMOG

Of the 16 West African states, Liberia was the only one which had not been colonized. Liberians were settled in their present territory by the US after the American Civil War. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Liberian's way of life is fashioned after that of the US.

Liberia is on the Atlantic Coast and has a population of about 3 million people. It had a democratic system of government until Master Sergeant Samuel Doe took over administrative control through a bloody coup d'etat in 1987. Doe, within a short period, eliminated most of his opponents, promoted himself to the rank of general, and consolidated his control over Liberia. The opponents which Doe had not been able to eliminate caused considerable problems. Doe could not check tribal crises and the constant insurgence groups displeased with his brutal

administration. Doe finally retired from active military service and sought reelection as the President of Liberia. His reelection as President marked the highest crisis point in Liberia.

Many coup attempts were staged against Doe after his reelection--the last by members of his own armed forces led by his trusted friend, Charles Taylor. Later a second insurgent group led by Yohnnie Johnson emerged. The conflict among the three parties led to a bloody massacre in Monrovia and other big cities in Liberia.

At the beginning of Liberia's military crisis, the US launched Operation Sharp Edge to evacuate US citizens. This further compounded the senseless killings and left the Liberians vulnerable to more violence.

After the US pulled out of Liberia, there was no one to deter further destruction of Liberia. The OAU and the UN tried to mediate for peace, but it was too late for peaceful negotiation. The situation became unmanageable for the OAU, and it became an eyesore to the West African community. To salvage what was left of Liberia, an ad hoc meeting of the ECOWAS was called in Nigeria, where it was decided that the ECOWAS community should establish a peacekeeping force to help Liberia. As a result, the ECOMOG was established about July 1990. With ECOMOG'S help, peace is gradually returning to Liberia.

Relevant papers on the establishment of ECOMOG are still classified. It is therefore difficult to say with certainty what the composition of the force is and which member states are contributing what. What is important, however, is that ECOWAS was able to put up a capable force that checked the excesses of the destructive forces in Liberia. Also of importance is that both the OAU and the UN recognized and praised the ECOMOG actions.

ECOMOG's is the most significant achievement to restoration of peace in Liberia. Others include--

- o Mutual military cooperation among West Africa subregional states.
- o Stronger economic cooperation among member states through the ECOWAS.
- o Respect for the West Africa subregion for being able to solve the subregional problem without outside interference or intervention.
- o Better political cooperation between member states.

JCMFA INTERESTS, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES

The interests, goals, and objectives of the JCMFA shall be derived from those of the African region as contained in the OAU charter. The main interest of JCMFA would be to ensure a stable, secure, and peaceful Africa through defense and deterrence roles to forward economic recovery and political and military stability in Africa.

The goals of the JCMFA would be to--

- o Motivate a stable and secure political environment in Africa.

- o Motivate foreign investment in Africa.

- o Encourage Economic cooperation like ECOWAS and African Economic Community (AEC) among member states.

- o Motivate and be a joint initiator with the private sector of the technological development and integrated industrialization of Africa.

The JCMFA's principal objective would be to assist Africa in solving its economic problems by achieving its stated goals and interests. It is expected that in the process of aiding economic recovery, it will also stabilize Africa's political and military crises.

PROVISIONING THE JCMFA

Personnel

The JCMFA member states would provide professional soldiers to constitute the JCMFA fighting force. Such professional soldiers would be members of the member states' armed forces. Modality for provision would be determined by a JCMFA Council. In addition to the active military personnel, there would be direct personnel recruitment at various command locations. Procedures for recruitment and training would be provided by a JCMFA Council. Civilian personnel would be provided by member states. As contained in Article 1 of the JCMFA Treaty

(Appendix A) contribution by member states would be entirely on a voluntary cooperation basis.

Resources

Resources would include arming, fueling, fixing, transporting, and protecting the JCMFA while it carries out its various roles. Resources would, therefore, be a major area of concern. With current African economic problems, it may be difficult to have adequate response from member states. It is, therefore, expected that there will be difficulties initially. However, as the organization grows, more member states will respond. Support from international organizations who believe in the force would be desirable. The JCMFA Manpower/Resource Development Committee would be charged with securing support. The Foreign Relations Committee would also play a useful part.

To eliminate the apprehensions of likely failures, innovative alternatives and persistency must prevail for the JCMFA to survive. African leaders must rally around the initiative to ensure its survival. The more weight and determination put behind its establishment, the greater the success that will be achieved.

Arms

Although arming the force is included under the title "provisioning the JCMFA," it deserves more attention because of its importance. Besides fighting men and logistics, the main factor in determining a force's

capability is the effectiveness of its weaponry. It is, therefore, important for the JCMFA to be adequately armed. This is not simple; many factors are involved. Two such factors are external and internal conditions.

External factors. Are the powerful nations in the world ready to see a force like the JCMFA existing in Africa? If not it may never be established. If yes, how armed must it be? How will the arms get to Africa? Will it be from the West, Europe, or East? What should the JCMFA expect from these nations? Although one of the thesis assumptions is that foreign assistance and cooperation will be readily offered, the Foreign Relations Committee and Manpower/Resource Development Committee would need to coordinate efforts to ensure a successful relationship. It would also provide answers to most of these questions.

Internal factors. Are member states economically strong enough to procure modern war machines from the industrialized nations of the world? If not, are they prepared to contribute part of what the military of each state has? If yes, how will the equipment be standardized considering that African states procure from vendors all over the world? The Defence Planning Committee and Economical Planning Council would have to provide answers to these questions.

JCMFA ALLIANCE

Member states would be those African states which are signatories to the JCMFA Treaty. By definition, Africa includes all of the continental African states, the island of Madagascar, and all the islands surrounding Africa. There are a total of 53 states in Africa. It is expected that at full participation, JCMFA member states would represent this total. This JCMFA alliance would be composed of the following bodies:

- o The JCMFA Council.
- o The Economic Planning Council.
- o The Military Committee.
- o The Defence Planning Committee.
- o The Manpower/Resource Development Committee.
- o The Political Consultation Committee.
- o The Technological Development Committee.
- o The Foreign Relation Committee.

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, PRINCIPLES, AND SCOPE OF THE JCMFA

The JCMFA will be a military framework designed to carry out the following missions:

- o Preventing external aggression.
- o Repelling aggression if it occurs.
- o Preventing subregional African military crises.
- o Playing a Peacekeeping role should subregional crises occur.
- o Participating in UN peacekeeping efforts.

- o Providing for continuous cooperation and consultation in political, economic, and military fields among member states and other international bodies.

- o Extending assistance to nonparticipating African states (should they exist).

While carrying out the above missions, JCMFA would have to observe the following limitations:

- o It should not serve as a force to police the African region.

- o It should never interfere with the affairs of independent states.

- o Its peacekeeping role should be strictly on invitation of the host nation, and the use of minimum force and ROE should be observed. (There should be acceptable justification and endorsement by OAU and the UN.)

- o It must respect all democratic processes. The rights of member states must under no circumstances be violated.

In line with the OAU, member states would express their desire to coexist peacefully with each other and the rest of the world. There would be affirmation of faith in the principles of the OAU and the UN. Preservation of peace, respect for democracy, noninterventionism, and mutual respect and understanding among member states would have to be paramount. Member states would have to be committed to achieve participation in international security and promotion of a stable Africa.

To achieve these common goals, the member states would have to agree on a number of undertakings in several fields. As indication of mutual agreement and approval, member states would have to sign a treaty. For example, all member states should agree to the use of minimum force only after the OAU exhausts all peaceful means to avoid endangering African peace and security. They should, for example, also agree to refrain from the threat or use of force in any way inconsistent with the purpose of the OAU and the UN. Furthermore, they should commonly agree that participation would be based entirely on voluntary cooperation. Force contribution would be voluntary and persuasive in nature. Appendix A shows some suggested contents of the articles of the proposed treaty for the alliance. Appendix B shows those of NATO.

In line with OAU and UN charters, and with particular references to Articles 2 and 51, the JCMFA Treaty would provide an alliance of independent African states with a common interest in maintaining peace and defending freedom through political and economic solidarity and adequate military defense. The Alliance would become an association of free African states united under the guidance of the OAU in their determination to preserve African security through mutual guarantees and stable relations with the world.

The JCMFA would serve the Alliance. It would provide the forum for joint consultation on any issues member states choose raise or for mandates raised by the OAU and decisions on military matters affecting security. The JCMFA would provide the structure needed to facilitate consultation and cooperation between member states, not only in military fields but also in other areas (as advised by the OAU) where policies can be coordinated to fulfill the goals of the JCMFA and the OAU.

The JCMFA would be a purely defensive alliance receiving its political and economic directives from the OAU. Its defensive capability would exist for the purpose of deterring military aggression, mediating in internal African military crises, and ensuring African internal security. The military posture would call for a strong, capable force able to adequately defend African territory from external aggression as well as being capable of mediating in African internal problems with minimum use of force.

The nature of threat and the financial capability of JCMFA would determine the strength of forces required to carry out these roles. Also, because of the defensive posture of the JCMFA, the right amount of force required to ensure an armed balance would be maintained. There is no intent nor would there ever be an intent to build a super military under the umbrella of the JCMFA. Furthermore,

since it has been the policy of the OAU to maintain peaceful coexistence with the West and the East, the JCMFA will have the role of deterring external interventionism. Therefore, the alliance would base its security policies not only on its military needs but on the other needs of the OAU that might JCMFA may be called on to perform.

In line with the OAU and UN charters, therefore, the JCMFA should adopt these methods in securing its interests, goals, and objectives. To effectively do this, the following committees will be responsible for formulating policies and supervising their implementation.

JCMFA COMMITTEES

The JCMFA Council.

The JCMFA Council (hereafter referred to as the Council) would be the highest decisionmaking authority in the Alliance. It would provide the forum for consultation between member states on all issues affecting their security. Member nations would have equal representation in the council. The chairman of the Council would be appointed by a unanimous vote. In most cases, such successful candidates would be one of the most senior and effective military officers at the JCMFA Supreme-Headquarters (SHQ). The appointment would be subject to the OAU's ratification. Furthermore, the appointed officer would be the Chairman, Joint and Combined Chief of Staff (CJCCS), of JCMFA forces (Figure 4).

The Military Committee.

The military committee would be responsible for all military activities in the alliance. It would be responsible to the council but under the command and control of the Defense Planning Committee. It would provide a forum for discussing and providing military security for the African region. It would be headed by a military officer of no less rank than Brigadier General. Each member state would be represented. Members would not be less in rank than Major or its equivalent in the Air Force and Navy.

The Economic Planning Council (EPC)

The Economic Planning Council would be an integral part of the AEC established by the OAU. It would be responsible for planning and implementing all economic programs as required by the OAU.

Defense Planning Committee. The defence planning committee would be the highest military authority in the alliance. It shall be next to the council in the hierarchy of decision making. Member states would be represented by their Assistant Secretary of Defense. The chairmanship would be rotated among member states. The chairperson would not be less in rank than Senior Ambassador or the Secretary of Defense (or its equivalent) of member states defense ministries.




FIGURE 4. MAJOR COMMITTEES OF THE JCMFA

The Man Power/Resource Development Committee

Manning and resourcing the JCMFA would be the responsibility of the Manpower/Resource Development Committee. The committee would be responsible for manpower recruitment and training. It would also be responsible for resource acquisition and distribution and maintaining liaison with member states to achieve desired levels of the JCMFA manpower/resource requirements. Membership and other roles of the committee would be determined by the Council.

The Political Consultation Committee

The Political Consultation Committee would be the link between the JCMFA, the OAU, and other international bodies on political affairs. Members of the committee would also be responsible for informing their respective nations of JCMFA activities. Representatives would brief the JCMFA on the overall policies and itinerary of their own nations with respect to the JCMFA.

The Technological Development Committee

In conjunction with the industry, science, technology, energy, natural resources, and environment committee of the OAU, the Technological Development Committee would work toward technological breakthrough in Africa.

The Foreign Relations Committee

Most foreign military relations would be coordinated by the Foreign Relations Committee. The committee would serve as the forum whereby all foreign military matters of the JCMFA were conducted. The committee would work in close cooperation with the Defence Planning Committee on matters affecting the defense of the AOR of the Alliance within the international community.

JCMFA COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEM

Rapid and reliable communications and information systems would be required by the JCMFA council and its committees. This would facilitate smooth and timely program coordination and adequate information management within the JCMFA area of responsibility (AOR). It would make command and control of assigned forces possible, and crises management would be made simpler. These requirements could only be met by using the most modern technology and integrating strategic and tactical communications and information systems into an overall JCMFA Command, Communications, and Information Network (CCIN) that would be managed by a CCIN Agency (CCINA). The agency would be responsible for equipment standardization and interoperability and also solve language difficulties.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

Regional Military Staff and Organization

The JCMFA Military Committee would be supported by an integrated regional military staff made up of military personnel seconded from independent state military establishments and from a direct-recruitment pool administered by the Council. The committee would be supported by civilian personnel at its headquarters. The regional military staff would be headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee, and could be from any one of the member states, as long as it was a different state than the one from which the chairman of the Military Committee came.

The organization of the regional military staff include the intelligence division, plans and policy division, operations division, logistics and resources division, communications and information systems division, equipment standardization division, research and technological development division, and liaison division (Figure 5). The JCMFA Military Committee would specify the responsibilities of each division on establishment.

Integrated Military Command Structure

There would be nine major commands and a supreme headquarters under the Military Committee. The various




FIGURE 5. THE JCMFA MILITARY STAFF ORGANIZATION




FIGURE 6. THE JCMFA MILITARY STRUCTURE


commands, with their suggested AORs, would include the following:

- o Regional Western Command - WESTCOM - West Africa Sub-Region - HQ (Nigeria).
- o Regional Eastern Command - EASTCOM - East Africa Sub-Region - HQ (Kenya).
- o Regional Northern Command - NORTHCOM - North Africa Sub-Region - HQ (Egypt).
- o Regional Southern Command - SOUTHCOM - South Africa Sub-Region - HQ (South Africa).
- o Regional Central Command - CENTCOM - Central Africa Sub-Region - HQ (Zaire).
- o Africa Air Force Command - AFAFCOM - HQ (Central African Republic).
- o Africa Naval Command - AFNACOM - HQ (Ghana).
- o Regional Logistic Command - LOGCOM - HQ (Algeria).
- o Regional Technical Command - TECHCOM - HQ (Senegal).
- o Regional Supreme Headquarters - RESH - (Rotational).

Figure 6 shows the relationship between the various commands. Map 6 also shows the AORs for each command.

CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

All committees and councils would have civilian staffs. It is quite difficult to envisage what the organization and structure would look like until the JCMFA is established. However, it is expected that the organization and structure would recognize the need for



Map 6. JCMFA Military Area of Responsibility

permanent representatives and state delegations from member states. It is also expected that departments such as political affairs and international relations, defense planning and policy coordination, defense support, infrastructure, logistics and technology would exist. The organization would serve as an international advisory body to the JCMFA.

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CHAPTER 5

REGIONAL STRENGTH AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

There are those who say that now we have no special role, no special place, but we are the United States of America, the leader of the world. And as long as I am President, I will continue to lead in support of freedom everywhere, not out of arrogance, not out of altruism, but for the safety and security of our children. This is a fact: strength in the pursuit of peace is no vice; Isolationism in the pursuit of security is no virtue.

President George Bush¹

Nations seldom survive without economic strength. A hungry continent cannot organize its society for viable social and political order. Economic crises mean hunger, and systemic cultural and social disintegration. Hunger creates fear, insecurity, and violence. Hunger breeds uncertainty, disenchantment, lack of focus, and loss of identity.

At the Annual Convention of National Religious Broadcasters held in January 1992, President George Bush remarked that Americans can outwork, outproduce, and out-compete any other nation in the world.² He could not have said it better, because America is economically strong and is confident of that stand. An African leader could not say such things about Africa without being sarcastic.

Therefore, any attempt to solve African's problems must start with the economy.

One way to solve economic problems is for Africa to develop its own technology. Of course, there are enormous problems associated with developing a workable technology, including political instability resulting in planlessness and shortages of research funds and resources. Africa could import technology, but the cost would be prohibitive.

Other possible solutions to Africa's economic problems might include foreign investments; balance of trade; industrial growth; a free, fair, and competitive African market; economic cooperation among African states; political stability; and power projection. All of these solutions, except for power projection, have been tried by various African states with minimum results. This thesis is suggesting power projection as the most probable solution.

An established coalition force in Africa would help stabilize Africa if member states would trust the force. As President George Bush said in his State of the Union Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on January 28, 1992, "Much good can come from the prudent use of power."³ If Africa, now divided into many sovereign states with independent armed forces, could come to terms and recognize one sole and preeminent power, and regard it

with no dread, then the security of Africa would be guaranteed. Within such a situation, the JCMFA would be able to--

- o Defend or deter aggression within and outside Africa.
- o Mediate and resolve in regional African crises.
- o Facilitate accelerated technological development through research and other cooperative efforts.
- o Help Africa to achieve political stability by reducing internal African crises.
- o Help foreign investors do business with Africa once it becomes politically stable.
- o Foster economic cooperation among member states and the rest of the world by exploiting the recognition given it by member states to encourage a free, fair, and competitive market in Africa.
- o Gain the recognition of developed worlds because of its pursuance of human right activities and the ability to maintain peace in Africa. This would, in effect, create confidence among the industrialized nations to export technology to Africa.
- o With a stable political environment and reduced military tensions, African leaders and planners could devote more time to resolving pressing African needs such as drought and hunger.

SOLVING ECONOMIC CRISES THROUGH POWER PROJECTION

Defense or Deterrence Posture.

External aggression in Africa is unlikely. Its main source of threat is from within because internal crises are common. For the JCMFA to be able to rapidly respond to crises situations, Africa could be grouped into three zones; South Africa, North Africa, and the rest of Africa. The JCMFA military structure would be composed of five major commands (WESTCOM, EASTCOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM and NORTHCOM) supported by an Air Command (AFAFCOM), a Naval Command (AFNAVCOM), and two component commands (LOGCOM and TECHCOM).

Crises Zones

South Africa. The threat from South Africa is more one of racial discrimination than military threat. Apartheid policies have spawned numerous conflicts between black and white South Africans, causing human loss and suffering. The ripple effect often extends beyond South African borders. JCMFA could help contain these problems by persuading South Africa, through dialogue and negotiation, to become a member state of the JCMFA. Under President DeKlerk, this is possible, particularly with the recent diplomatic initiative of the South Africa government to visit other African states (Nigeria and Togo) to open bilateral and diplomatic cooperation. In recent times, some African states have opened up diplomatic relations

with Pretoria. Other states have also been running low-key diplomatic cooperation, and this development could be hastened to allow South Africa's successful participation in JCMFA.

South Africa would also need to be persuaded to meaningfully contribute force (men and material) to the JCMFA. This would ensure its full commitment and active participation as well as its trust and cooperation.

South Africa's participation would be vital for the establishment of SOUTHCOM, which would be headquartered at Pretoria with an area of responsibility covering Angola, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, Lesotho, and South Africa.

The successful realization of these three vital tasks would ensure--


- o South Africa would become a nation member of the OAU.
- o That diplomatic ties would be established between all member states and South Africa, which, in turn, would create a greater forum for dialogue and cooperation in many areas of mutual interests (such as apartheid).
- o The consolidation of the JCMFA. South Africa is one of the most militarily powerful states in Africa today. Its membership would be a great asset to the coalition force. The JCMFA would benefit tremendously from South Africa's military experience, and, because of South Africa's influence in the region, its support for the JCMFA

would earn the coalition force recognition and respect. Finally, force contribution would be better enhanced for the JCMFA, because South Africa would be capable of contributing both money and military resources to the coalition force.

- o That diplomatic cooperation between South Africa and its neighbors would ease the existing tension caused by internal crises resulting from South Africa's apartheid policies. The end of apartheid would also reduce South Africa's internal unrests.

By admitting South Africa to the JCMFA, most of the internal crises experienced in this zone could be resolved. South African leaders could then spend more time attending to economic problems, and other African states could develop economic cooperation with South Africa without fear.

North Africa. Religious, ideological, and racial differences are mostly responsible for unstable conditions in North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt). A high percentage of the inhabitants of the zone are Muslims and most are Caucasian (Map 8). Such differences have at times manifested ideological feelings that those groups did not belong to Africa. They were often described as white Africans, while the rest were called black Africans. These differences have often been the cause of tension between Africans. Libya, for example,



Map 7. Penetration of Islam.
 Source: Central Intelligence Agency,
 OIC Map Services Center, Washington, D.C., 1992

has not only constantly intervened in Chad's internal problems, but it continues to meddle into the internal problems of other African states as well.

As in South Africa, meaningful dialogue and cooperation could begin if the five northern states would become members of the JCMFA. Their membership will help the JCMFA to achieve the following:

- o Establish the NORTHCOM within the zone.
- o Secure force contribution from the zone. particularly from Egypt which has a very large force, good technology, and a good link with the US.
- o With the establishment of NORTHCOM, the JCMFA would be able to maintain its presence in the zone. This would help create a peaceful zone where mutual respect and understanding could exist.
- o Ensure economic, political, cultural, and social cooperation within the region and the continent at large.

These results cannot be achieved overnight. It would take much effort and would require serious patronization and diplomatic moves to get results. But it could be done. For example, to resolve religious differences "Black African" Muslim states would have to engage in diplomatic negotiations with "White African" states.

The Rest of Africa. The rest of Africa includes Sub-Sahara Africa, which contains about 34 independent

African states. The SSA constitutes the poorest and most troubled region in Africa. Problems mostly stem from poverty, maladministration, and natural disaster. This zone would readily accept membership into the JCMFA. However, at first, many of the states would not be able to make meaningful force contribution. Over time, this would change.

In general, if success were achieved in all zones, Africa would witness the following:

- o The JCMFA would have wide acceptance in Africa.
- o Membership would increase and funding would improve.
- o Members would have the confidence to trust the JCMFA as a pre-eminent force able to deter and defend Africa.
- o The JCMFA would be able to gain the recognition and respect of the developed world, because it would, with time, prove its capability to move Africa away from its continuing state of crisis.
- o The emergence of a peaceful and stable environment conducive to economic growth.

OTHER ADVANTAGES

The JCMFA would also be able to guarantee other advantages for Africa as well, including--

- o Accelerated technological development which would be a positive step toward enhancing political and economic development under a stable environment. For example, before and during WWI and WWII, technology was often

developed specifically for military purposes. For example, many German industries were established purely to produce military materiel. However, after the wars, industries gradually reverted to peacetime applications. The JCMFA doctrine calls for a force capable of structuring, equipping, and training itself to the level of a modern, efficient, and effective force. Like the Germans, the way the JCMFA could reach this goal would be to become the motivator and joint initiator, with the private sector, of technological development through research and cooperation with developed nations.

- o Aiding political stability. If the JCMFA is to be respected and trusted with the responsibility of defending and deterring aggression in Africa, it must be able to reduce internal military crises in Africa to create political stability in Africa. Other ways the JCMFA could further political stability would be through cooperation with the militaries of developed nations and by participating in joint operations.

- o Motivating foreign investors. A politically stable Africa would be able to attract foreign investors. Besides creating a stable environment, the JCMFA could guarantee a climate in which the industrial world could do business in Africa.

THE OAU AND THE JCMFA

For the JCMFA to be successful, it must operate under political guidance. That political body would be the OAU. The JCMFA would be the military arm of the OAU and its activities would be controlled by the OAU. The question then is, why is it the JCMFA, rather than the OAU, which would solve Africa's economic problems? The answer is that the OAU has tried several times (and is still trying) through diplomatic and political means to resolve economic problems. But the OAU has recorded little success because of its inability to ensure peace. Without peace, African states will continue to be distracted from planning Africa's future. The JCMFA would afford the OAU a force to support its peace campaign.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC STABILITY

Much has been said and written about the importance of military strength to a nation's economic growth. Arguments against this claim may be presumed as academic exercises and a waste of time. For example, there is no doubt that the military might of the US, the UK, and other countries contribute to their economic strength.

The US

In January 1992, when President Bush, in his State of the Union Address before a Joint Session of the US Congress, said "We are the United States of America,

the leader of the world," he was confident of the US's military capabilities. He could not have been referring to economic leadership because he is aware of the present economic situation. The US had just won a big military victory in Southwest Asia. In addition, the US has had numerous other military victories. However, the US also has a record list of economic recessions.

Despite the current economic position of the US, however, its economy is still one of the best in the world because of the peaceful environment in which US economy grows. It is the policy of the US for the military to prevent the continental US from becoming a battlefield. As a result, peace always exists within its borders. Therefore, in the US, force projection aids economic growth.

Japan

One can reasonably argue that there are two principal factors responsible for Japan's economic development. First, Japan was militarily powerful before and during WWI and WWII and during those wars, Japanese industries (which were until then producing military hardwares) were destroyed. However, they were totally rebuilt and have become the modern industries of today. Second, the US military has contributed to Japanese economic development. After WWII, the US forced Japan to renounce its military build-up. With the determination of

the US to ensure Japan's compliance, Japan's most likely alternative was to shift its military experience into economic development. Although most of its industries were destroyed after the war, Japan used the industrial experiences to rebuild. The underpinning factor here is that military influence was partly responsible for Japan's unprecedented economic growth.

The EEC

The EEC, which was established in 1957, has grown into an European economic giant under the protective and watchful eyes of NATO. Although the US is yet to be admitted into the community, there is no denying the fact that both the US and NATO have influenced the economic growth enjoyed by the EEC. The JCMFA can benefit from the experience of the EEC in modeling its roles in motivating African economy.

Soviet Union

Although the Soviet economy was in trouble despite its military might, it can be argued that with its population and size, its economy was reasonable when compared with the economies of the rest of the world. And of more importance to this thesis is the fact that the Soviet military was able to keep the Soviet Union safe enough to allow economic development. However, the Soviet system was so dominated by force projection that it could not achieve the balance required between military strength

and economic growth. For the JCMFA to be effective in motivating Africa towards economic recovery and economic growth, its leaders must not make this same mistake. The OAU and member nations should know when to draw the line between force projection and economic growth. Africa must be able to determine a correct balance that would help create a strong JCMFA and a strong economy.

THE ECOWAS

Ironically, it is an economic outfit, ECOWAS, that created the ECOMOG in West Africa. This condition seems to counter my argument that a force projection is desirable for economic growth. However, the argument still holds that the establishment of the ECOMOG created stronger ties among member states. This may be connected to the fact that member states were brought closer together while funding the force. It may also be connected with the achievement of the ECOMOG and the associated benefits enjoyed by ECOWAS member states. As stated earlier, the establishment of the ECOMOG has greatly increased the economic and political cooperation among ECOWAS member states. This is a model for the JCMFA to develop its own economic motivation strategy.

BUILDING A FORCE PROJECTION IN AN ECONOMICALLY DEPRESSED REGION

African economic and political positions are so bad that the reader of this thesis may find it unbelievable

that it recommends a military solution, because a military establishment would add to the overall economic burden. There are also reasons to believe that the thesis proposal is unrealistic and may not work. For example, in 1990, a 50 million dollar emergency fund to support ECOMOG was never achieved. Only 2.5 million dollars were collected--70 percent of which came from Nigeria.⁴ Another example was when Nigeria lost 80 million dollars on an OAU peacekeeping force in Chad.⁵ This raises the big issue of who is going to fund the JCMFA.

As bad as these examples sound, they can be explained. In the first place, it was good that Nigeria was able to bail out ECOMOG member states. Despite the poor financial response, ECOWAS managed to establish the ECOMOG, and ECOMOG has recorded remarkable successes that validate its creation. The peacekeeping force sent to Chad performed equally creditably in spite of all odds. Although Nigeria again paid the price, the establishment of the peacekeeping force attracted some financial and logistic support from the West.⁶ The cost of establishing the JCMFA would eventually be repaid by economic returns.

If Africa is serious and determined to improve itself economically, the developed nations of the world will be ready to assist. For example, in the early 1980s, France tried to gain European support and funds for an

African security force which would have comprised troops from several (mainly African French-speaking) countries, with logistic support and equipment coming from western countries. The force would have been used to intervene in African conflicts and to counter foreign intervention. Even though the force was not initiated, the idea was sound. The UN and other western powers have also given assistance to many peacekeeping efforts in Africa. It is, therefore, possible, in spite of existing African economic crises, for the JCMFA to be established.

CONCLUSION

From all evidences and arguments presented in this thesis, it is clear that there are economic, political, and military crises in Africa. Although they have been helpful, diplomatic and other efforts have not solved these problems. The OAU has not been sufficiently effective in solving the crises either. However, this thesis establishes the fact that a military approach to the crises is workable. Based on these evidences and arguments, therefore, I conclude that the JCMFA is in fact capable of solving African economic crises if it were to be established.

ENDNOTES

1. George Bush, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 28, No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: February 3, 1992), 172.

2. George Bush, Speech delivered to the Annual Convention of National Religious Broadcasters (Washington, D.C.:), 172 January 1992).

3. George Bush, State of the Union Address (Washington, D.C.: January 28, 1992).

4. Sunny Biaghere, "Towards Fortress Africa," Jane's Defence Weekly (New York, N.Y.: January 18, 1992), 84.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

APPENDIX A

THE JCMFA TREATY--A PROPOSAL

Abuja, Nigeria, January 2, 1994¹

The parties to this Treaty hereby affirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charters of the OAU, the UN, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments within and without the continent of Africa. They are determined to safeguard the freedom and conserve the heritage and civilization of Africa, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty/human right, and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the continent of Africa. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security in Africa.

They therefore agree to this JCMFA Treaty.

ARTICLE 1

Member states will undertake to resolve regional and interstate disputes in which they may be involved through voluntary and peaceful means in a manner that will not endanger regional and international peace, security, and justice and to refrain in their regional relations from the

threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the OAM and the UN.

ARTICLE 2

Participation will be voluntary through preservation and conviction, stressing cooperation among themselves.

ARTICLE 3

To effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, member states shall separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4

Force contribution by member states will be voluntary and relative to the individual state's capability.

ARTICLE 5

Member states will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of them is threatened.

ARTICLE 6

Voting power and command appointment by member states shall be a function of the degree of force contribution and active participation. However, there shall be no veto power by one or a group of member states.

ARTICLE 7

Member states resolve that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against all, and consequently agree, the JCMFA shall be evoked to assist the member or members so attacked by taking such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the African region.

ARTICLE 8

For the purpose of Article 7, an armed attack on one or more member states is deemed to include an armed attack--

- o On the territory of any of the member states in Africa.

- o On the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the member states in Africa.

ARTICLE 9

For the purpose of Article 7, an armed attack by one member state against another shall be considered an act of aggression that threatens peace and stability of Africa and the existence of the JCMFA. Member states, therefore, resolve to mediate without taking sides to seek peaceful settlement without the use of force. Member states further resolve to penalize both parties with heavier penalties awarded to the guilty party. An appropriate body with even representation from both parties will investigate and

recommend penalties to the SHQ JCMFA who, in consultation with the OAU, will approve and award penalty.

ARTICLE 10

For the purposes of Articles 7 and 9, member states resolve that any attack by a non-member African state against a member state shall be considered an attack against all, and consequently agree, the JCMFA shall be evoked to mediate by taking such action as it deems necessary less than the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the African region.

ARTICLE 11

Member states hereby establish a Council on which each of them should be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary.

ARTICLE 12

Member states may, by unanimous agreement, admit new non-member states who wish to become members at any point in time. Any state or states so admitted may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its or their instrument(s) of accession with the OAU secretariat who, in turn, will inform all member states through the SHQ JCMFA of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 13

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by member states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Supreme Headquarters, JCMFA, which will notify all signatures of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatures have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 14

After the Treaty has been in force for 5 years, or anytime thereafter, members shall, if any of them so request, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in Africa and with due respect to the constantly changing world environment.

ARTICLE 15

After the Treaty has been in force for 15 years, any member may cease to be a member 6 months after its notice of denunciation has been given to the OAU secretary which will, through the SHQ JCMFA, the other member states of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 16

This Treaty, which shall be in English and French, shall be deposited in the archives of the OAU secretary. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by the SHQ JCMFA to the governments of all member states.

ARTICLE 17

Member states agree that the most important fact is the maintenance of security and peace and upon which a stable Africa economic process can grow. They, therefore, resolve to uphold this at all cost.

ENDNOTE

¹Abuja is hypothetically selected. It could have been Cairo, Egypt, Nairobi Kenya, Acra Ghana, etc.

APPENDIX B

The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949¹

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international

relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be

considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6²

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- o On the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France,³ on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

- o On the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the

Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

ARTICLE 7

The Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.⁴

ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary, in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

ENDNOTES

1. The Treaty came into force on August 24, 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

2. As amended by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey, signed on October 22, 1951.

3. On January 16, 1963 the Council noted that in so far as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

GLOSSARY

AEC	African Economic Community
AFAFCOM	Africa Air Force Command
AFL	African Leadership Forum
AFNACOM	Africa Naval Command
ALB	AirLand Battle
ALBF	AirLand Battle Future
ALF	African Leadership Forum
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CCIN	Command, Communications, and Information Network
CCINA	Command, Communications, and Information Network Agency
CENTCOM	Central Command
CJCCS	Chairman, Joint and Combined Chief of Staff
DM	Deutsche Mark
EASTCOM	Eastern Command
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Peacekeeping Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	European Economic Community
EPC	Economic Planning Council
FM	Field Manual
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HQ	Headquarters
IMF	International Monetary Fund

INFO	Information
INTEL	Intelligence
JCMFA	Joint and Combined Military Force for Africa
LIC	Low-Intensity Conflict
LOG	Logistics
LOGCOM	Logistic Command
MTME	Million tons maize equivalent
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
OAU	Organization of African Unity
RESH	Regional Supreme Headquarters
SHQ	Supreme Headquarters
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SSA	Sub-Sahara Africa
TECHCOM	Technical Command
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US/USA	United States of America
WESTCOM	Western Command
WFP	World Food Program
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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